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Abstract: 
 
Pension fund assets have been accumulated rapidly during the past decades, and it is 
evident that this trend will continue. An immediate problem arising from the rapid 
accumulation of such a large volume of assets across countries is how to invest them. 
Pension funds differ from other institutional investors, e.g. mutual funds, in that their 
investment horizons are relatively long, typically 30-40 years. In addition, they are 
pooled assets to support people’s retirement lives. The authorities have a policy 
concern about their investment performance, because otherwise, the shortfalls will 
have to be met by the nation state (Clark and Hu 2005a). In this paper, we seek to 
address this issue from the macro perspective. By using a unique dataset covering 39 
countries (17 EMEs and 22 OECD) and based on the classic mean-variance 
optimisation approach, first we find a negative impact of international portfolio 
investment restrictions on pension fund returns and risk, and this issue is particularly 
serious for EMEs. Following a shift from the QAR to the PPR, the average risk is 
expected to fall by 27% for EMEs pension funds, while the figure is 10% for OECD 
pension funds. Second, there is evidence that if higher portfolio returns are wanted, 
higher proportion should be invested in equities and foreign assets. Third, our results 
show that pension funds should value the diversification benefit arising from property 
investment (Booth 2002).  
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1. Introduction 
 
People are living longer, and how to tackle the problem of ageing population is at the 
top of governments’ agendas. The key current trend regarding social security systems 
is the shift from unfunded schemes, e.g. pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funded schemes. 
The Aaron (1966) conditions state that if the market return is greater than the 
population growth rate, funded pension systems are more appropriate. However, 
funded plans have been also argued to be related with some drawbacks, e.g. high 
transition costs. Despite the topical debate about the merits and demerits of funded 
systems, many governments across the world have shown strong interest in funded 
pension schemes, not least due to the efforts from the World Bank (Holzmann and 
Hinz 2005).  
 
Consequently, pension funds, defined as accumulated assets contributed by sponsors 
and beneficiaries to provide for the deferred future pension entitlements of 
beneficiaries (Davis 1995, Bodie and Davis 2000), have increased markedly across 
the world during recent decades (Davis and Hu 2005a; OECD 2005). 
 
As highlighted in Davis and Hu (2005a), pension fund markets in OECD countries 
have witnessed a noticeable increase in pension assets. For example, UK pension 
assets were equivalent to 115.6 billion US dollars in 1980, (21.5% of GDP), but in 
2000 these two figures rose to 1226.3 billion US dollars (85% of GDP). Many other 
OECD countries also saw the same trend. Meanwhile, as of 2000, total pension fund 
assets across 18 selected advanced OECD countries reached the level of US$12 
trillion. The US was the biggest pension market, accounting for just above half of the 
whole assets. Two other major countries were Japan and the UK. In terms of pension 
assets relative to GDP, the Netherlands had the largest figure at 149% of GDP, while 
this figure for New Zealand was 0.69%, the smallest across OECD countries.  
 
As for emerging market economies (EMEs), Chile witnessed its pension funds, 
growing from zero in 1980 to 60 per cent of GDP as of 2002 (latest figure was 65% as 
of 2003, see OECD 2005). The biggest EME pension markets, however, were 
Singapore and Malaysia, two countries which adopted provident pension systems in 
the 1950s. Total pension assets across 29 selected EME countries were US$ 280 
billion, while the average pension asset to GDP ratio was 12%, much less than OECD 
countries’ 42%.  
 
It is virtually certain that pension funds will continue their rapid expansion during the 
coming decades. An immediate problem arising from such a large volume of assets 
across many countries is how to invest them. Pension funds are different from other 
institutional investors, e.g. mutual funds, in that their investment horizons are 
relatively long, up to 40 years. In addition, other institutions, e.g. mutual funds, tend 
to only undertake security selection by specifying the assets invested, while pension 
funds usually consider both security selection and asset allocation (Davis and Steil 
2001).  
 
Meanwhile, since pension funds are pooled assets to support people’s retirement lives, 
national governments have a particular concern about their investment performance 
and associated risk. If pension funds are managed poorly, and unable to pay incomes 
to retirees in due time, governments may have no political choice, but to incur fiscal 
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costs to meet up these losses (Clark and Hu 2005a). Hence, how to ensure pension 
funds are managed in an appropriate way is becoming an increasingly important issue 
for national governments. In this paper, we seek to address this issue, from the macro 
perspective. Our ambition in this paper is not to provide commercial advice at a micro 
level about how to allocate pension fund assets, but rather, from the perspective of 
regulators, to give a formal assessment of the presence of beneficial effects when 
investment is liberalised. Specially, we seek to make four contributions. First, we 
quantitatively investigate whether international diversification benefits exist, and if 
so, what is the extent. Second, are such effects different across OECD countries and 
EMEs? Third, we construct and use our own series of global equity/bond returns 
which are expected to be immune to country specific shocks. Fourth, we use a dataset 
of asset returns which is the largest in the current pension literature to assess optimum 
portfolios.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following manner. Section 2 addresses 
the issue of investment strategies employed for different pension plans. In Sections 3 
and 4, we consider arguments for and against portfolio restrictions, particularly on 
foreign investment. In section 5 using the mean-variance framework, we seek to 
empirically analyse whether pension fund investment restrictions on foreign assets by 
the national regulators are justified. In this section, we use a dataset covering 39 
countries, including both OECD countries and EMEs. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Pension fund investment  
 
The general trend of current company pension fund sector development is away from 
defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) pension plans by many businesses. 
One of the key differences between these two types of pension plan is who bears the 
investment risk (Baker et al 2005; Clark and Hu 2005b). For the former, pension 
benefits are defined in that they are always a certain percentage of the employee’s 
final salary, regardless of the fund management’s performance. In this context, plan 
sponsors bear the investment risk. If pension fund investment is run badly, plan 
sponsors have the obligation to make good such losses by using their own assets. In 
contrast, for the DC plans, the investment risk is transferred to the individual 
employees. Plan sponsors make payments to DC plan participants’ accounts by 
matching employees’ contributions. Meanwhile, besides company funds, pension 
assets could be managed in a more individualised way, in that plan participants are 
always left to decide how to invest their assets from a range of different fund 
managers, like in the US 401(K) plans and in the Australian Superannuation Funds 
(Clare 2005). For DC plans, however, any investment risk falls on individuals, 
although the risk is ultimately borne by the government. The underlying rationale is 
that, as a result of bad investment returns, any shortfall might have to be met by the 
state if either DC or DB schemes cannot deliver sufficient supplementary income to 
avoid pensioner poverty and income inequality (Clark and Hu 2005a). 
 
2.1 Investment strategies for defined contribution plans 
 
In recognition of the difference between these two types of pension plan, it is argued 
that different investment strategies are applicable to DC and DB pension plans (Bodie 
1998; Davis 2001). Specifically, in the context of defined contribution plans, as noted 
earlier, risks are transferred to plan participants, and the sponsors do not need to 
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worry too much about the performance of the pension funds. Therefore, the 
investment process should focus on the asset side only, with liabilities being an 
insignificant issue. In other words, fund managers should closely follow the portfolio 
investment theory, i.e. the mean-variance approach. As regards the mean-variance 
approach, the mean is referred to as the expected return from the various investment 
assets in the portfolio, e.g. bonds, equities, etc., while variance is the corresponding 
risk. This approach holds that a DC pension fund should in principal maximise 
expected return for a given risk, so as to attain as high as possible a replacement ratio2 
at retirement. In addition, Blake (1997) argues that, in order to find the optimal asset 
combination along the optimal frontier, it is always sensible first to determine the risk 
preference of investors, then, based on the risk level, to find out expected returns. 
According to this rationale, Blake suggests that pension assets be directed to risky but 
high return assets, e.g. equities, when the fund is immature or the duration is relatively 
long, while bonds investment should be given more weighting when the fund 
becomes mature.  
 
Specifically, the optimal portfolio of pension funds is contingent upon an investor’s 
investment horizon. Normally, young people should invest more in risky assets, e.g. 
stocks, while the older person is relatively conservative and more willing to buy safe 
assets, e.g. government bonds. This is in line with the assertion that risk aversion rises 
with age. This argument, as a rule of thumb by financial planners, however, is not 
consistent with financial theories (Cahill and Campbell 2004). For example, 
Markowitz (1991) argues that for any rational investor, young or old, the optimal 
investment portfolio should combine risk-free assets, e.g. treasury bills, and risky 
assets, e.g. bonds and stocks, which also refers to the classic two-fund separation 
theory (Copeland and Weston 1992). According to this theory, when it is needed to 
consider a less risky investment, it simply means a fund shift from risky portfolio to 
risk-free assets, i.e. treasury bills. Through this movement, it is not necessary to 
change the risky portfolio’s asset mix. In addition, Bodie (2004a) highlights that there 
is no necessary connection between investment horizon and risk aversion. Investors 
with long time horizons might be risk averse, while those with short time horizons 
might be risk lovers. For example, a wealthy businessman in his 50s might not be as 
risk averse as a young worker who does not have a permanent job. Therefore, the 
classic financial theory implies that the optimal asset allocation has nothing to do with 
time horizons and ages. 
 
When analysing pension fund investment, conventional financial theory, however, 
might be flawed or inappropriate, if not allowing for other factors. The point relates to 
labour income. Campbell and Viceira (2002) consider future labour income to be a 
risky asset, which in their view should be matched by some type of risky assets, e.g. 
stocks, in terms of funds investment. Therefore, the more future labour income, the 
more investment in risky assets. Consequently, young people, compared with 
old/retiring people should invest more in risky assets, e.g. stocks, in that they have a 
relatively long time to retire, and labour income comprises a large portion of their 
life-long wealth/portfolio. When approaching retirement, which implies that a smaller 
proportion of life wealth portfolio is made up of future labour income, and also given 
that labour income should be always matched by a corresponding amount of high risk 
assets, then the investment portfolio should tilt towards less risky assets, e.g. 
                                                
2
 Replacement ratio is defined as the ratio of pension income to the final salary.  
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government bonds. This argument is the extension of an earlier work by Bodie, 
Merton and Samuelson (1992), where they show that if future labour income is 
certain, optimally employed investors should hold proportionally more stocks in their 
portfolios than retired investors. This result applies whether labour supply is flexible 
or not. When there is greater labour supply flexibility, employed investors are advised 
to take more risk by investing in stocks.  
 
The arguments above are also consistent with the theoretical model designed by 
Viceira (2001). The author assumes that labour income is perfectly correlated with the 
value of human capital, and the return on human capital is given by the percent 
change in labour income. By deriving an approximate analytical solution of the model 
it is proved that the fraction of savings invested in risky assets increases/falls with age 
in the early/late part of the life-cycle. The finding is in line with the standard life-
cycle model (Ando and Modigliani 1963), as depicted by the hump-shaped form of 
saving pattern, which might induce a similar pattern in the percentage of assets 
invested in risky assets, e.g. equities. Using numerical simulations on models with 
risky labour income, Heaton and Lucas (1997) and Koo (1998) find that investors 
should hold most of assets in equities, indicating the importance of high-return assets 
in common investors’ asset portfolio. Meanwhile, if it is assumed that short selling is 
allowed, they find that investors are even willing to sell short bonds and use the 
proceeds to buy equities.  
 
2.2 Investment strategies for defined benefit plans 
 
As mentioned above, in DB plans, the sponsors are not only responsible for making 
contributions to the plan, but they are also obliged to guarantee a pre-determined 
retirement benefit. Therefore, a strategy considering both assets and liabilities is more 
sensible, which means matching pension assets and pension liabilities, in terms of 
maturity and value.  
 
Regarding the pension liabilities, there are three commonly used definitions 
(Holzmann et al 2004). The first one is known as the accumulated benefit obligation 
(ABO), which is equal to the accumulated pension obligations if the pension plan 
were closed down completely at the time of calculation. The second definition is the 
projected benefit obligation (PBO), which, unlike the ABO, is based on the 
assumption that the plan would not be terminated completely at the time of 
calculation, and allowed to continue until all plan participants died, i.e. they carry on 
working, contributing and getting salary rises. The last one is the indexed benefit 
obligation (IBO), in which, liabilities are calculated by indexing retirement pension to 
wage increases or prices. In comparison to the first two definitions, the IBO is less 
popular in current practice, as indicated in Davis (1995) and Holzmann et al (2004).  
 
Regarding the ABO and PBO, there is no definite answer about which one is better, 
and it depends on specific conditions. If the analysis is at the macro level, for 
example, involving a calculation about the level of national implicit pension debts, the 
PBO is preferred, since pension payment is kind of debt underwritten by the 
government or sponsor, and it has to be paid periodically until all participants die. In 
contrast, if the analysis is at the micro level, i.e. for a particular company, Bodie 
(2004b) argues that the ABO, as the actual economic cost associated with the DB 
scheme sponsors, is an appropriate definition to use. In other words, from the 
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economic and shareholders’ perspective, the pension obligations guaranteed by the 
company is the accumulated obligations, rather than the projected ones. The intuition 
is that if a firm goes into bankruptcy, the shareholders are obliged to pay off the losses 
according to the ABO calculation, but subject to the constraint of the residual funds, 
while the difference between these two estimates based on the ABO and PBO is met 
by the government through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Group (PBGP) in the US, 
the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in the UK, or via general fiscal assistance.  
 
Davis (2005a) argues that if the plan sponsor seeks to fund the accumulated benefit 
obligation, and the obligation is nominal, i.e. without price-indexation, then the 
strategy of portfolio immunisation is most appropriate. Immunisation is the process of 
constructing a portfolio that has no interest rate risk (Luenberger 1998), with the 
present value and duration3 of the future obligation of pension funds matching those 
of the portfolio, mainly fixed-income assets, e.g. bonds. Another related case is 
whereby the sponsor agrees to make price or inflation indexed pension payment at 
retirement. Immunisation in principal is still the best choice, but in this context, long-
term inflation protected bonds should be used. Bodie (2001, 2004b) is a strong 
proponent of the only-bonds investment strategy. He does not believe equities offer 
higher returns and inflation protection in the long run. In contrast, he suggests default-
free and inflation protected government bonds are the most sensible investment 
instrument for retirement provision. Any other investment policy, he argues that, 
unnecessarily increases the risk borne by the employees or the shareholders of the 
corporation. Consistent with such argument, the UK’s Boots pension funds switched 
all assets into bonds in 2001 (Blake 2003a). 
 
Bodie’s arguments are to some extent in line with the analysis by Campbell and 
Viceira (2001), who note that long-term bonds are appropriate financial instruments to 
provide a stable income stream to long-lived risk-averse investors. In the paper, they 
attribute the investor’s demand for long-term bonds to two reasons, i.e. speculative 
purpose and hedging purpose. The former arises from the fact that holding long-term 
bonds has a term premium, in comparison to short-term bonds and treasury bills, 
while the latter relates to long-term bonds’ desirable property of providing a stable 
income stream in a long term. Their findings are stronger if index-linked, rather than 
nominal, long-term bonds are used. As noted by Davis (2002) and Hu (2005a), 
however, such long-term bonds with price protection are not available in many 
countries. Even in those countries, like the UK and the US where financial markets 
are deepest, total outstanding inflation-indexed government bonds were much less 
than the aggregated pension fund assets (GFSR 2004). For example, in the UK, as of 
2003, inflation-indexed government bonds were at the order of $139bn, while pension 
assets were $954bn. Unless the inflation-protected bond market undergoes a 
significant growth, and reaches a high level in the near future, the all-bond investment 
strategy for pension plans is not feasible at the national aggregate level.  
 
Partly due to the scarcity of long term, particularly index-lined bonds (de Martel 
2004), a mismatch between pension funds’ cash flows and liabilities always emerges 
(Ryan 2004). It basically means that in some years, cash flows from bond investments 
are greater than the corresponding liabilities, while in other years, the opposite 
                                                
3
 The duration of a fixed-income instrument is the weighted average of the times that payments (cash 
flow) are made, and it always lies between the first and last cash flows. For the zero-coupon bond, 
however, the duration equals its maturity date, as the only and final payment is made at maturity.  
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happens. Such a cash mismatch can lead to inefficient asset distribution over the life 
of pension plans, as well as sub-optimal portfolio risk budgeting (Sharpe 2002). 
Another similar concept is “gap risk” (Siegel 2003), which gives rise to the same 
consequence, i.e. a cash mismatch. The underlying reason, however, is different. As 
for pension funds in many countries, fund managers’ performance is often evaluated 
against a strategic benchmark. Those benchmarks, by definition artificial, reflect the 
issuance pattern in the market. For example, for a bond benchmark, the duration and 
cash flow profile is simply a weighted average based on the market weightings of 
major bonds with different maturities. Given low weights of long dated bonds, the 
strategic bond benchmark reflects more information on short or medium bonds, 
typically 10 or 15 years bonds. In this context, the traditional bond benchmark is not 
appropriate, since the duration of pension liabilities is normally quite long, e.g. 20 
years or longer. Therefore there is a gap, arising from the popular investment practice 
where fund managers mange pension funds with long durations against relatively 
short benchmarks.  
 
To minimise the cash flow gap between assets and liabilities over the life of DB plans, 
particularly those plans linked to inflation and wage increases, major fund mangers 
have introduced new financial products into the market. For example, in early 2005, 
SSgA (State Street Global Advisors) marketed its new product, i.e. PALMs (Pooled 
Asset Liability Matching Solution) (Dootingh 2005). The product involves the 
exploitation of inflation-linked swap market, aiming to match pension assets and 
liabilities at a greater certainty. In addition, the period could range from few years to 
40 years, long enough to cover most pension funds. In addition, given the significant 
impacts of changes in inflation and interest rates on DB plans’ liabilities (Clark and 
Hu 2005b), CSFB (Credit Suisse First Boston, 2005) argues that hedging techniques 
need to be employed. For example, their simulation results show that by conducting a 
40-year hedging programme, the level of both interest rate and inflation risks in a 
representative DB pension fund could be reduced by up to 75%, thus leading to a 
better match between assets and liabilities. CSFB’s argument is consistent with recent 
findings by Engle et al (2005), where they find the beneficial impacts of interest rate 
swaps on the risk-return profile of a typical DB plan, by using a scenario-based ALM 
model.  
 
Recent developments in new financial products, as discussed above, reveal the 
importance of matching assets and liabilities in DB plans. Similarly, actuaries use 
returns on the assets to discount liabilities; in this context, the asset-liability mismatch 
is minimised. The actuarial practice sounds reasonable, however, it is groundless, at 
least economically, since if assuming it is correct, the natural implication is that 
pension liabilities could be reduced by investing in risky and high-return assets. 
Largely due to this concern, pension accounting has undergone major changes, i.e. a 
gradual move to the fair value or mark to market approach (Skerratt 2002; Fore 2004), 
for example the IAS (International Accounting Standards) 19. Although from the 
economist’s perspective, the traditional practice of discounting liabilities in the 
actuarial industry is wrong, it addresses an important aspect of pension fund 
investment, i.e. understanding liability evaluation and asset allocation at the same 
time. Inkmann and Blake (2004) argue that in the current literature and practice, the 
valuation of liabilities and the optimal allocation of pension assets are considered to 
be two separate processes. They further argue that it is dangerous in that it ignores the 
inter-linkage between these two issues. To counter this shortcoming, they design a 
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theoretical model by combining these two parts together. With numerical examples, it 
is found that the default spread (the likelihood that the promised pension payment 
cannot be delivered) has a negative relationship with equity investment, i.e. the more 
investment in risky assets, i.e. equities, the less likely that a company cannot cover the 
value of the pension liabilities.  
 
If the obligations are based on the PBO methodology, Davis (2005a) considers risk 
diversification to be the most appropriate investment approach. The underlying 
reasoning is that the projected benefit obligation is associated with more risk, which is 
implied by the ongoing nature of the liabilities calculation. Labour earnings growth is 
relevant in this case, in that the workers accrue benefits as salaries rise. Consequently, 
in order to reduce the risk as much as possible, a risk diversification strategy should 
be utilised. A variety of assets are available in the markets, and all serve as potential 
investment instruments, e.g. bonds, equities, and property (Booth 2002) and even 
hedge funds (IPE 2004; Kat 2005). Given the different risk and return characteristics 
of various assets (Davis 2001; Watson Wyatt 2004) and based on finance theory, in 
general the risk of pension portfolio is smaller, if more different classes of assets are 
included. Even within the same asset class, it is likely to achieve diversification. 
Siegel and Waring (2004) argue that for diversification purpose, a combination of 
index-linked bonds with equities is less desirable than that with nominal bonds. The 
reason is that returns on index-linked bonds and equities are much more closely 
correlated than those between index-linked bond and nominal bonds, which in turn 
arises from the common inflation protection feature associated with equities and 
index-linked bonds.  
 
Among all the available assets, one class of assets, which have been a close focus of 
interest in the arena of pension fund regulation, is foreign assets. Given the 
importance of this issue, we will discuss it in the next section.  
 
3 International investment 
 
3.1 Arguments in favour of international investment 
 
Modern finance theory (Levy and Sarnat 1970; Solnik 1998) believes that 
international investment in a portfolio offers better diversification, which implies a 
lower risk for a given return, or a higher return for a given risk. Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates the benefits of global diversification. For example, when the risk is fixed at 
the level of 21% (proxied by standard deviation), a purely domestic investment for a 
US investor can achieve a return at the level of 16%. When foreign opportunity is 
utilised, however, the potential return can rise to 20% with no short sales, and 23% 
with short sales. Similar benefits, also available for other countries as shown in Figure 
1, mainly result from the elimination of unsystematic risk. The volatility or risk could 
be decomposed into two kinds of risks, i.e. unsystematic risk and systematic risk for 
international portfolios. The former is always referred to as the risk specific to a 
particular country, while the latter is the risk relevant to the whole global economy. 
Given that the former is only associated with some particular countries, therefore, the 
strategy of international investment could be employed to remove them, whereas as 
regards the latter, whatever the portfolio construction, it is not possible to eliminate 
them.  
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In the context of international investment, therefore, an appropriately constructed 
global portfolio should in principle be able to eliminate any unsystematic risk. 
Although both OECD countries and EMEs can benefit from global diversification, it 
is argued that the beneficial impacts on EMEs are larger (Reisen, 1997; Section 5 in 
this paper). This is largely due to high volatilities suffered by the financial markets in 
EMEs, as well as the lesser correlation between domestic and international markets. 
Based on a large dataset covering equity markets in more than 80 countries and with 
the observation period back to 1850 in many cases, Goetzmann et al (2005) find that 
emerging markets serve as an important and useful component to expand the 
opportunity set of a fully diversified portfolio, thus justifying across-border 
investments between advanced and emerging markets. In addition, the financial 
underdevelopment in EMEs (Davis 1998; Vittas 2000; Hu 2005c), i.e. lack of 
experience of financial regulators, weak accounting practice, is suggestive of 
investing abroad.  
 
As noted at the outset, the underlying reasoning for the global portfolio is that the 
markets of the world do not move in the same direction, so a downturn in one country 
can be offset by a rise in another country, which reflects the typical phenomenon of 
varying business cycles across countries in the medium term (Backus et al 1992). 
Therefore, international investments allow pension funds to be less vulnerable to 
domestic growth, which is not feasible for PAYG systems. In a long run, the different 
aging process and demographic structure of different countries, notably developed 
and developing countries, can also justify the cross-country investment (Davis 2005a). 
In emerging markets, the capital-output ratio normally is quite low, which is 
associated with the high rate of return to capital. Therefore, the higher returns in 
emerging markets stimulate capital outflows from ageing regions, e.g. Europe and 
Japan. Such capital movement between countries has been argued to be mutually 
beneficial. For the outflow countries, like the UK, investment diversification is 
achieved by seeking higher returns, while for the inflow countries, like China, 
economic growth is boosted as the capital inflow spurs the productivity. It is worth 
noting, however, that if such capital flows cease abruptly, it can cause macro 
disruption to recipient countries.   
 
The classic mean-variance approach traditionally relies on the assumption of 
symmetric risk, i.e. equity markets move proportionally or in same magnitude 
following good and bad news. The reality, however, is that in many cases, the risk is 
asymmetric, i.e. equity markets become more volatile after negative return shocks, 
than positive news (Davis 2003). To answer the question whether global 
diversification benefits exist when they are most needed, i.e. in bear markets, Thorp 
and Milunovich (2005) incorporate asymmetric risk into their model. Their numerical 
examples show that the international investment benefit is still available, and the 
asymmetric risk model they used can even lead to more benefits than 
traditional/symmetric risk model. The finding, however, is only available for long-
horizon investors.  
 
Concerning the beneficial effects arising from investment from developed countries to 
emerging markets, Holzmann (2000), however, argues that such investment can only 
mitigate, rather than solve the aging problem. By drawing on simulation results by 
MacKellar et al (1999), he notes that in contrast with the scenario without foreign 
capital flow, the scenario with free foreign capital flow only causes global GDP to 
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increase slightly, e.g. 0.53% in 2020, and 1.04% in 2050. In this context, the fast 
aging countries (FAC) face a decreasing GDP due to more capital outflows and the 
slow ageing countries (SAC) face an increasing GDP due to more capital inflows.  
 
The reverse capital flows from the FAC (developing countries) to the SAC (developed 
countries), mentioned here, have been doubted by some commentators. In fact, recent 
experience has SAC’s lending to FAC via foreign exchange reserves. For example, 
Wolf (FT 2005) notes that if emerging markets are to lend on a vast scale to any 
government, it should be to their own governments which need capital, rather than 
accumulating foreign-exchange reserves. Along with the debate on the issue of global 
saving glut (IMF 2005; SFRC 2005), Bernanke (2005) and Sanyal (2005) argue that 
foreign reserve accumulation in many emerging markets is justified, if not an optimal 
strategy, in that it reduces the risk of inefficient asset allocation in the domestic 
markets, and also serves as a buffer against potential capital outflows in the near 
future, a lesson learned from the string of painful financial crisis worldwide, e.g. in 
Mexico in1994, in South Asia in 1997-98, in Russia 1998, and in Argentina in 2002. 
 
3.2 Augments against international investment (home bias puzzle) 
 
As discussed above, modern portfolio investment theory suggests a globally 
diversified portfolio construction, and any other under-diversified portfolios are 
subject to unnecessary unsystematic risk which could have been removed. The reality, 
however, is that on average investors, both institutions and individuals, hold most of 
their assets in home markets. As regard pension funds, it is revealed that in most 
countries, pension fund portfolios have much greater allocation to domestic bonds and 
equities than to foreign assets (French and Poterba 1991; Davis 2005a). For example, 
as of 2004, the UK’s top 100 pension funds allocated 5 per cent of total assets to bank 
deposits, 23 per cent to domestic bonds, 45 per cent to domestic equities and only 27 
per cent to foreign assets (Clark and Hu 2005a). How to explain this phenomenon - 
known as home bias puzzle?  
 
A variety of arguments have been identified to explain the home bias puzzle. The first 
is the transaction cost associated with international investment, which includes 
information cost, bid-ask spread, and trading commission, among others. The 
transaction costs are not trivial in many cases, and particularly high for those 
investment in emerging markets, since in order to realise the potential higher returns 
in the unfamiliar markets, investors have to incur extra costs on information collection, 
marketing, etc. For example, one recent empirical study by Faruqee et al (2004) finds 
a negative linkage between transaction/information costs and foreign investment. In 
that paper, they use an IMF survey dataset covering 23 countries, 3 of which are 
emerging markets – Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. One dependant variable is 
j
ieq , defined as equities of country j held by the residents of country I (in millions of 
US dollars) in 1997; this is designed to proxy capital flows between countries. In 
order to capture the relation between transaction/information costs with jieq , a 
number of explanatory variables are used, which are jidist (the physical distance 
between the capital cities of country I and j, jilin  (a dummy variable to look at 
whether the capital inflow and outflow countries use the same language), 
phoneline (the number of main phone lines in use per 1,000 inhabitants in country i), 
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and cos iphone t (the per-minute international phone costs from country i to country j 
during business hours. Their empirical results show that a higher transaction cost does 
lead to less equity flows between countries. For example, one of their estimations 
reveals that a one per increase in jidist , i.e. distance between countries i and j, results 
in a 0.559 per cent decrease in jieq , i.e. capital flows from country i to country j.  
Similar results are also found when expanding the equation by adding more potential 
explanatory variables, e.g. cos iphone t .  
 
Meanwhile, Kang and Stulz (1997) find that in the Japanese stock market, foreign 
investors are more interested in those Japanese firms which have better information 
access and more open to the investors, even though the returns are not expected to be 
higher than those from other firms. The explanation for the findings of this 
observation is that information costs related to such firms are lower, thus they are 
more attractive to foreign investors. A more recent study by Aggarwal et al (2005) 
stresses the importance of information transparency to investors. By using data at both 
country and firm levels, it is found that US institutional investors invest more in 
emerging markets and firms which have greater accounting transparency as well 
better legal framework. In addition, by employing Bayesian approaches, Herold and 
Maurer (2003) find some evidence, supporting the home bias in the US. In line with 
Muermann et al (2005), they include regret into the analysis, and conclude that the 
optimal allocation of a typical US investor’s pension funds to foreign assets is 12%, 
when it assumes that regret aversion4 equals risk aversion. In addition, De Roon et al 
(2001) investigate the home bias puzzle, and find that if market efficiency is assumed, 
i.e. no transaction costs and no short sales, there are strong global investment benefits. 
If transaction costs are taken into account, however, such diversification gains 
disappear, though the authors admit the possibility of small-sample bias.  
 
Another explanation for the presence of the home bias is that home investment can 
hedge against the part of wealth that is not tradable or traded in capital markets. This 
explanation highlights that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which is central 
to calculate the optimal risk and return mix, implicitly assumes that all wealth of 
investors are liquid and tradable. But this assumption obviously ignores the non-
tradable assets, e.g. human capital. Therefore, does this omission explain the home 
bias? (Lewis 1999). Empirical work by Baxter and Jermann (1997), however, rejects 
this hypothesis. In that paper, human capital is found to be positively related to both 
domestic equity and foreign equity, but the correlation with the former is larger. 
Therefore, they suggest a short-position for domestic equities, and the optimal 
portfolio should comprise a larger share of foreign equity than the actual portfolio, i.e. 
to diversify risk. For example, allowing for human capital, whereas foreign equity is 
found to be 20% in the actual portfolio of the investors, it is in the range of 49% and 
69% in the optimal portfolio. 
 
In addition, it is argued that the diversification benefit can be achieved in the same 
way by holding shares of multinationals, e.g. Ford, British Petroleum, which are all 
global organisations having presence across many countries. Therefore, economic or 
                                                
4
 Regret aversion refers to the common people’s dislike of the disutility of not choosing the ex-post 
optimal alternative. For example, if the return on Stock A turns out very high, the investor might regret 
not having allocated more assets to it.  
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political conditions in overseas countries would affect the multinationals’ profits, and 
further share prices. For example, good sales of Ford vans in one country, e.g. China 
would offset weak sales in another, e.g. Russia, which is exactly the underlying 
rationale behind the diversification theory as noted earlier. This explanation seems to 
be plausible, but it does not hold empirically (Lewis 1999). Studies have shown that 
the share prices of multinationals move very closely with the stock market indexes in 
their home countries, and in some cases, it is near to a one-to-one movement. 
Therefore, holding shares of multinationals cannot guarantee the diversification 
benefits arising from a fully diversified portfolio. Meanwhile, even if we assume the 
argument above is valid, it might only apply to large and advanced economies (Davis 
1998), like the US, UK and Germany, etc. where multinationals are headquartered and 
listed. For most other countries, the home bias is not justified, and hence international 
investing is still desirable, on the ground that those countries have very few, if any, 
truly global companies which can readily diversify their operating and business risks. 
In other words, it is very difficult for a mainly domestic portfolio in such countries to 
be constructed in a way to achieve a reasonable degree of global diversification as in 
the US and the UK.  
 
Another relevant argument, doubting the beneficial impacts of global diversification, 
relates to the shift from country to industry factors (Ferreira and Gama 2004). 
Traditional wisdom and evidence show that the benefits of diversification mainly 
arise from investments across countries, rather than industries (Beckers et al 1996; 
Rouwenhorst 1999). Recent empirical work, however, reveals the reverse, i.e. the 
increasing importance of industry factors in explaining firms’ returns, relative to 
country factors. Based on a dataset covering 36 industries and 39 countries, Campa 
and Fernandes (2005) construct two series of mean absolute deviation for both 
country and industry factors. By using these constructed data, it is found that in the 
1990s, country factors dominated industry factors, while in 2000s and onwards, 
industry effects become dominant. It gives evidence that investing across countries 
has been less desirable than investing across industries in terms of global risk 
diversification since 2000. On the other hand, by separating country/industry effects 
between mature and emerging markets, Phylaktis and Xia (2005) find the different 
effects across countries. In other words, in mature countries, firms’ returns were more 
explained by industry factors, while in emerging markets, country factors still 
dominated. It is noted that even in those cases where industry factors dominate, 
diversification across countries is still needed in that the same industry might face 
very different operational conditions, e.g. varying level of political risk between 
developing and developed countries.  
 
The last but not least explanation for home bias preference is concerned with foreign 
asset restrictions on pension funds from the national authorities. We talk about this 
issue in more detail in the next section.  
 
4 Pension fund regulation  
 
Pension funds, as one form of large financial institutions, are subject to various 
regulations, although the structures of such regulations differ across countries 
(Srinivas et al 2000; OECD 2001, 2004). Davis (2001) details the principal portfolio 
regulations for pension funds as well as life insurance companies across 9 advanced 
countries. In that paper, he identifies two forms of government policies on pension 
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fund investment; one is the strict quantitative asset restrictions (QAR), where the 
government makes specific regulations, typically on the limits of holding a particular 
class of assets. For example, the latest statistics (Yermo 2003) show that, in Germany, 
a maximum of 25% of pension fund assets could be invested in equities and 
maximum 50% in bank deposits; as for foreign assets, there was a 70% currency 
matching requirement. The other form has the minimum specific regulations, known 
as the prudent person rule (PPR). The definition of PPR is not definitive and difficult 
to pin down (Vittas 1998); one definition from the OECD (Galer 2002) states that 
under the principle of the prudent person rule:  
 
A fiduciary must discharge his or her duties with the care, skill, prudence and 
diligence that a prudent person acting in a like capacity would use in the conduct of 
an enterprise of like character and aims.  
 
In the context of pension fund investment, it is referred to as the investment strategy 
whereby pension funds are invested prudently as someone would do in the conduct of 
his or her own affairs (Davis 2001). In that paper, Davis identifies 7 advanced 
countries implementing the PPR for pension fund investment, i.e. Canada, Finland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, with the remaining two, Germany 
and Sweden following the strategy of quantitative asset restrictions. Regarding 
emerging market economies, most countries adopted the QAR approach (Yermo 
2003), particularly at the earlier stage. For example, Chilean pension funds were not 
allowed to invest in the international capital markets in the early 1980s when its 
pension system just started privatisation (Fontaine 1997), but this restriction was 
eased gradually over time, in that they become less relevant when the capital markets 
become more mature and developed (Vittas 1998; Acuna and Iglesias 2001); now it is 
permitted to invest up to 12% abroad (Srinivas et al 2000). This gradual policy 
relaxation happened in China as well (Hu 2005c). Initially, all pension funds in China 
were allowed to invest in bank deposits only. Since the late 1990s, however, pension 
funds have been permitted and encouraged to invest in equities, although through 
investment mandates to local mutual fund managers. As of end 2004, pension funds’ 
foreign investment was still not allowed, although the validity of this restriction is 
under discussion. Despite recent trends of removing restrictions, many countries still 
restrict pension fund investment. Why do governments regulate pension fund 
investment, particularly in terms of foreign investment?  
 
4.1 Arguments favouring pension fund regulations 
 
Pension funds are a distinct form of asset, in that they are collected and managed with 
the purpose of proving retirement provisions for millions of retirees in each country. 
Meanwhile, explicitly or implicitly, governments always stand behind social security 
systems. If retirees cannot receive enough income to live, the government has to incur 
fiscal costs to meet it (Clark and Hu 2005a), although pensioners might not receive 
the same amount of income as expected from their funds.  In consequence, to mitigate 
the adverse impacts of excessive risk taken by fund managers, governments seek to 
restrict the investment assets available to pension funds.  
 
Market failure is another argument explaining why the authorities seek to regulate the 
pension fund industry (Davis 2001). Market failure is an economic phenomenon 
where the free market mechanism cannot solve economic problems in an efficient 
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matter, thereby justifying the intervention of the government. There are three aspects 
of market failure, i.e. information asymmetry, externality and monopoly. Information 
asymmetry always induces well-informed parties with private information to 
selectively contract with less-informed parties, thus exploiting the latter. Examples 
include the pension mis-selling and Maxwell scandals in the UK (Blake 2003b). 
Given the concerns about pension funds’ performance, partly following such 
information asymmetry, it was recommended in the Myners Review of Institutional 
Investment (2001) to enhance pension fund trustees’ competence. A recent survey 
also emphasises the growing responsibility, and thus the importance of competence 
and expertise of pension fund trustees (Clark et al 2005; NAPF 2005).  
 
Externalities arise when the behaviour of a particular group of people or firms have 
implications on others. Bank runs following the failure of a major financial institution 
in the market is one example here; nevertheless, whether such contagion could occur 
for pension funds is less clear. In response to this risk, the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Group (PBGP) was set up in the US, while the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) was 
recently created in the UK; such a guarantee mechanism is conceptually similar to 
deposit insurance from banking regulations (Hinz et al 1999).  
 
A third form of market failure relates to the degree of market power. In the context of 
pension funds, it means if the market is controlled by a small number of plan sponsors, 
these sponsors might intend to optimise the interests of the management, but at the 
expense of plan members. Also, if all employees are forced to join pension schemes, 
it might entail poor conditions for pensions, e.g. long periods investing.  
 
Pension fund investment regulations have many forms. But typically they specify 
holding limits by five dimensions, i.e. asset class, concentration of ownership, issuer, 
security, and level of risk (Srinivas et al 2000; Yermo 2005). Holding limits by the 
issuer and/or security means that pension fund’s investment in a particular 
issuer/share, e.g. Microsoft, cannot exceed a specified percentage of the pension fund 
portfolio, e.g. 10%. The underlying logic is that an excessive investment exposure to a 
single firm entails high risk. Based on modern portfolio theory, holding a single firm 
has far higher risk than holding the whole market. This argument was proved by 
numerous real-world examples, e.g. the collapse of big names, e.g. Enron, Worldcom. 
Even the seemingly most healthy firms might go into bankruptcy overnight, implying 
the risk of investing in one firm. Limits to concentration of ownership mean how 
much of a firm could be held by pension funds. 
 
All five types of investment restrictions, i.e. by asset class, concentration of 
ownership, issuer, security, and level of risk, are similar to the prudential regulation 
techniques used in other financial institutions, e.g. banks (Hinz et al 1999). For 
example, the first one, i.e. restriction by asset class, is closely linked to diversification 
and capital adequacy when regulating banks. By the same token, it also plays an 
important role in the pension fund investment industry, which is the focus of this 
paper. As noted above, two approaches apply to the restriction by asset class, one is 
the strict quantitative asset restrictions (QAR), the other one is the well known 
prudent person rule (PPR). Reasons why the QAR approach is popular in many 
countries include the high risk associated with some assets and people’s dislike of risk 
and failure to understand portfolio diversification. I 
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Davis (2005a) presents results showing that different assets have different return-risk 
characteristics. Across OECD countries, the average return of domestic bonds over 
1967-1995 was 1.7% with standard deviation at 16.8%, while those two figures of 
domestic shares were 8% and 22.5% respectively. However, given that most trustees 
and regulators are more concerned about the security of pension funds, upper limits 
are always imposed on the holdings of risky assets, e.g. equities in many countries, 
even they offer corresponding higher returns. A recent survey from OECD (OECD 
2001 and Yermo 2003) shows that 14 out of 27 OECD countries placed specific 
restrictions on equities’ maximum holdings. Concerning bond investment, however, 
only 8 of 27 countries had any restrictions.  
 
4.2 Arguments favouring restrictions on foreign investment 
 
The first concern is the possibility of domestic savings to flow offshore. Therefore in 
order to keep such scarce resources at home, especially for developing countries, strict 
investment regulations are imposed. This argument is strengthened by the positive 
linkage between domestic savings, and particularly pension assets, and economic 
growth and financial development, as reviewed by Davis and Hu (2005b). For 
example, Davis (2004) outlines how pension reforms which introduce elements of 
funding can have a positive impact on financial market development, e.g. following 
such pension reforms, the functions of financial markets are improved. In addition, 
empirical work has found not only the strong positive linkage between pension 
reform/pension assets, growth and finance, but also the causality relationship between 
them (Holzmann 1997, Walker and Letfort 2002, Davis and Hu 2005a, Hu 2005a and 
2005b). If pension fund assets have such positive implications, there is a natural 
incentive for the reforming governments to restrict pension funds to be invested 
domestically, although foreign pension funds might flow in if there is no constraint on 
capital inflows. The theoretical analysis (Fischer and Reisen 1993) suggests that 
liberalisation of capital outflow controls would entail capital outflow at the early stage, 
and capital inflow at the later stage. So the total effect is a net capital inflow in the 
long run. The long term positive impact is due to the ease of the repatriation of 
domestic assets, thus reducing foreign investors’ worry about inward investment in 
the first instance. 
 
The second concern is the reforming government’s consideration of using pension 
assets to finance implicit pension debts (Holzmann et al 2004). It is well known that 
under traditional pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, huge amounts of pension debt are 
accumulated due to the unfunded nature. If the pension reform is towards the direction 
of fully or partially funding, such IPDs will become explicit. In general, there are two 
methods to finance such debts, taxes and debts (Reisen 1997). For tax financing, it has 
the problem of a double burden on the current working population. In addition, high 
taxes are always an obstacle to investment at least in the short run, thus further 
limiting economic growth. Therefore, debt financing is more appropriate from the 
government point of view, if it is assumed that private sector follows the Ricardian 
hypothesis5. In this context, pension assets are viewed as captive funds. In other 
words, the government seeks to keep pension assets at home, e.g. by strict investment 
regulations to pay off the IPD. Typically, a minimum holding imposed on government 
                                                
5
 Ricardian theory refers to the hypothesis that rational consumers will automatically adjust their 
personal saving and consumption inter-temporarily so as to smooth their current and future 
consumption (Seater J  J 1993).   
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bonds is specified. There is, however, a concern that if pension funds only hold 
government bonds, there is only a distributional difference of funding and PAYG, in 
that under both scenarios, pension debts or pension promises are underwritten and 
paid by the government.   
 
The last argument in favour of restriction on international investment of pension funds 
is closely linked with capital controls. As highlighted in Davis and Hu (2005a), 
pension fund assets are very large relative to the economy in many countries. For 
example, Hu (2005a) shows that the average ratio of pension assets to GDP was 42% 
for 18 advanced OECD countries as of 2002, while this ratio was 12% for emerging 
market economies (EMEs) in the same year. The latest statistics give the pension 
assets-GDP ratio at 61% across 26 OECD countries as of 2003 (OECD 2005)6. In 
recognition of the size of aggregate pension assets in each country, it is argued that 
capital mobility might lead to significant capital outflows, therefore inducing 
exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic instability. National experience from the 
UK indicates the driving force of pension funds in capital outflows (Reisen and 
Williamson 1997). For example, foreign assets accounted for 15% of the UK pension 
fund portfolio in 1985, up from 7% in 1979, showing the effect of financial 
deregulation, as capital controls were abolished7.  
 
All three arguments above are related to government’s fear on excessive capital 
outflow. In order to eliminate or at least reduce this fear, Merton (1990), Bodie and 
Merton (2002) design one innovation, called the international pension swap. In this 
context, pension funds in one country enter a swap contract with a financial institution 
in another country. Then at the end of each period, only the difference of required 
payments to both parties, rather than the principal plus the difference is involved. For 
example, the notional principal is $100million, and the return in world stock market is 
5 per cent, while that in domestic market is 3 per cent, then the amount flowing out of 
the country is only (5%-3%)*100=2million, much less than the principal of $100 
million. By investing in this way, the unintended and potential undesirable side effects 
of pension capital flight are significantly reduced, while the benefits of international 
diversification are still achieved.  
 
However, against this idea of international pension swaps, Menil (2005) argues it does 
not come without costs, i.e. there is always a wedge between costs of capital raised 
domestically and those raised overseas. The author considers it as the economic cost 
of the pension swaps. But it is the existence of the return wedge across borders which 
justifies the benefits of international diversification in general, and the international 
pension swap in particular. In other words, if the world market becomes highly 
integrated and such swaps become feasible on a large scale, there is no need to 
diversify unsystematic risks by investing abroad.  
 
4.3 Arguments favouring restrictions on equities 
 
                                                
6
 Besides the larger sample size in the OECD’s work, differences between our data with OECD’s might 
be due to the different methods used to calculate the average. In other words, OECD uses the weighted 
average by GDP, while we use the simple average. 
7
 Since the early 1980s, the UK domestic financial markets have been in the process of deregulation, 
easing capital controls and reducing transaction costs.  
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The main argument in favour of a constraint on equity investment is the high risk 
associated with equities. Equities and bonds are two major investment instruments for 
pension fund investment. It has been widely known that equity investment has higher 
volatility than bonds, but is rewarded by corresponding higher returns. In our 
empirical part of this paper, we present the descriptive statistics of assets returns on 
equities and bonds. In comparison to returns on bonds, equities are more risky, but 
have higher returns. Give these observations, it is arguably agreed that equities are a 
good investment instrument for long-lived assets, e.g. pension funds, and pension 
plans in many countries indeed hold large volume of equities in their portfolios, for 
example, UK pension plans (Clark and Hu 2005a), and Australian superannuation 
plans (Clare 2005).  
 
Bodie (2004, 2001), however, does not agree with the current investment practice. As 
we noted earlier, he is a strong supporter of the bond-based investment approach, as 
he does not believe the higher risk related to equities is rewarded sufficiently by the 
corresponding higher return. In addition, he argues that the traditional pension 
investment approach underestimates or simply dismisses the severity of the high risk 
of equities, i.e. the extreme cases of stock market failure, whereby any potential large 
loss, e.g. due to a major war, would have devastating negative impact on pension 
assets. This is a real concern for retirees, as most of them are risk-averse. 
Comparatively, government and corporate bonds are safer, hence Bodie suggests the 
most appropriate investment approach should invest only on inflation-indexed bonds. 
However, as noted, the reality is that total outstanding inflation protected bonds were 
much below the total pension assets (GFSR 2004). Taking the UK as an example, as 
for 2003, pension fund assets reached at $945bn, while the inflation indexed bonds 
were only around $139bn. As discussed in Section 2.2, the scarcity of long-term 
bonds, particularly indexed-linked bonds, also leads to the mismatch between 
liabilities and cash flows for DB plans.  
 
The above argument stresses the low risk associated with bonds, compared to equities. 
If this is true, risk averse members under DC plans might favour bonds, since they 
have to take any investment risk. If we consider DB plans, however, the consequence 
will be different. In the DB case, risk is transferred to sponsors, therefore members 
might not really care whether equities or bonds are invested in. There is more risk 
sharing between pensioners and workers in DB than DC plans. Meanwhile, if we view 
DB plan sponsors as risk averse agents, same as ordinary individual investors, a bond 
investment approach might be still justified from their point of view. This is, to some 
extent, in line with what happened in 2001, when the UK’s Boots pension funds 
switched all assets into bonds (Blake 2003a). Despite the high profile case of Boots 
pension funds’ composition change, corporation pension plans in many countries still 
hold large volume of assets in equities, as mentioned at the outset in this section. Gold 
(2000) argues that the heavy allocation of pension assets to equities for DB plans in 
the US, is attributable to biased accounting/actuarial methods. In other words, by 
investing in equities, accountants can manipulate financial reports to the extent that 
profits are overstated, and pension liabilities underestimated.  
 
5 Empirical work 
 
As discussed above, concerning pension fund regulation, there are two approaches 
(Davis 2002); one is the QAR (strict quantitative asset restriction), the other one is the 
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PPR (prudent person rule). We believe a priori that the latter is more desirable than 
the former. In this section, we seek to empirically analyse whether this hypothesis is 
valid and if so, to what extent. The methodology is based on the well-known mean-
variance framework (Markowitz 1959).  
 
5.1 Data description 
 
Data used in this section cover 39 countries, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Among 
them, 17 are emerging market economies (EMEs), i.e. Argentina (ARG), Brazil 
(BRA), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Hong Kong (HKG), Indonesia (IDN), India 
(IND), Israel (ISR), South Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX), Malaysia (MYS), Pakistan 
(PAK), Peru (PER), Philippine (PHL), Singapore (SGP), Thailand (THA), and South 
Africa (ZAF), while 22 are OECD countries, i.e. Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), 
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Germany (DEU), Denmark 
(DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Greece 
(GRE), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands 
(NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Sweden (SWE), and 
the US (USA).  
 
We have annual returns on 9 different classes of assets over 39 years from 1966-2004; 
those returns are short-term asset yields (MPY), bank loans yields (BLY), mortgage 
yields (MOY), domestic corporate bond yields (CBY), domestic government bond 
yields (GBY), domestic equity yields (EQY), property yields (PRY), foreign equity 
yields (FEQY), and foreign bond yields (FBY). We expect these assets to be the sort 
of asset section from which the optimal pension fund portfolio should be constructed. 
To our knowledge, it is the most detailed dataset of this kind, although in Davis 
(2005a) and Davis and Steil (2001), they use a similar dataset but with shorter time 
periods, i.e. 1967-1995. It is noting, however, that for our computation, we consider 
one basic model and four variants. The basic model refers to the case where 7 asset 
classes are used, i.e. MP, CB, GB, EQ, PR, FEQ, and FB. In order to check robustness 
of our results, we have four variants, i.e. a) with BL&MO, b) with MO, c) with BL, 
and d) with BL and MO but without PR. These four variants are selected in that the 
preliminary analysis shows that their optimisation results are not plausible8.  
 
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the observation periods for different classes of assets are 
not the same, i.e. our dataset for each country is not balanced. Therefore, in order to 
make our data balanced, we simulate those missing values, according to the 
assumption of normal distribution (see the next section for details). After such data 
manipulation, datasets for all countries are balanced. The last columns of Tables 1 and 
2 give the observation periods for each country after such manipulation.  
 
In addition, in Davis (2005a), the global equity/bond returns are calculated by using 
domestic assets for G-7 countries, i.e. AUS, CAN, DNK, DEU, JPN, NLD, SWE, 
GBR and USA. Ideally, however, more countries should be used, since other 
countries, particularly some emerging markets, are playing an increasingly important 
role in the global financial markets. For this study, we construct the global 
equity/bond returns, based on our own designed formula, i.e. Equation 1 as follows:  
                                                
8
 One relevant point is that pension funds in most countries do not invest heavily in bank loans. In 
addition, the returns we have in our dataset may be incorrect, i.e. exaggerated, since they do not 
account for bank default.  
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R* is the global returns for a particular country, and R is the domestic returns for all 
the other countries. Inf is inflation rates in the particular country, i.e. changes in the 
CPI (consumer price index); inflation rates are obtained from the WDI (World 
Development Indicators) (2005). EX∆  is changes in bilateral exchange rates, as 
calculated by the author, using the exchange rate dataset from the IMF database. In 
the paper, we adopt direct quotation, i.e. using a particular country’s currency as the 
price currency, and quoted as home currency/foreign currency (home currency for one 
unit of all the other currencies). According to our direct quotation, when the value of 
EX increases, equivalent to home currency’s depreciation, the returns denominated in 
the home currency should increase. W (varying year by year) is global weights by 
market capitalisation, and those data for market capitalisation are obtained from the 
WDI 2005 and Datastream. In Equation 1, i denotes the country dimension, and we 
have data for 41 countries in total, including 18 EMEs and 23 OECD countries. 
Compared to the number of countries in Tables 1 and 2, when calculating the global 
equity and bond returns, we have data for one more country, i.e. Poland and Iceland, 
respectively. In other words, data for 40 countries are available when computing 
global equity and bond returns. t is the time dimension, and the observation period is 
1966-2004, i.e. 39 observations.  
 
It should be noted that in order to obtain the pure global returns for one country, e.g. 
country A, we drop country A from our dataset, and only use the data relating to all 
remaining 39 countries. For example, to construct the global equity return for 
Australia, we use the equity return data for all countries, but Australian data. By 
constructing the global returns under this method, we expect one country’s global 
returns will not be correlated in a material manner with the returns of other assets, e.g. 
domestic equities, thus maximising the beneficial effects arising from global 
diversification; as the lesser the correlation between assets, the more benefits achieved 
from diversification. Note that by our definition, the global returns for each country 
are different.  
 
Descriptive statistics for these real return data, i.e. mean and standard deviation, are 
given in Tables 3 (OECD countries) and 4 (EMEs). By comparing data in these two 
tables, it is indicated that the real asset returns in EMEs are much more volatile than 
those in OECD countries, and at the same time, the former is higher than the latter in 
many cases. For example, as regards the government bond yield, the average value for 
OECD countries was 4.1% (mean) with 1% (standard deviation, SD), while it was 
5.5% and 12.6% for EMEs. When we excluded ARG, BRA, CHL and PER from our 
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EMEs dataset, given extreme numbers associated with these 4 countries associated 
with hyperinflation, the average mean and SD of the government bond yield was 
6.9% and 12.5%, respectively. As shown in Table 4, returns in EMEs were quite 
volatile, and one contributing reason for foreign assets was the large exchange 
movement occurred in individual countries’ history. Indeed, it is such large changes in 
exchange rate, mainly in the form of home currency’s continuous depreciation, that 
lead to high returns on foreign investment for EMEs, which is particularly relevant to 
Latin American countries (Jackson et al 2005).  
 
All return data, except the global returns, were collected from a variety of sources, i.e. 
Davis and Steil (2001), Datastream, Global Financial Data, IMF database, Jakob 
Madsen (Copenhagen), national central banks and the WDI (World Bank Indicators) 
2005. The global equity and bond returns were calculated by the author, based on the 
formula as in Equation 1. In addition, all return data are in real terms, i.e. adjusted for 
inflation. Detailed information about observation periods and data sources are given 
in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
5. 2 Model and methodology 
 
5.2.1 Theoretical model and mean-variance approach 
 
The theoretical models or arguments supporting international diversification are 
derived from the classic mean-variance model, which Markowitz (1959) first 
designed and introduced to finance studies, particularly in the field of portfolio 
management. He says that the efficient set of feasible mean-variance opportunities 
can be found by solving two standard optimisation problems. First, we can maximise 
portfolio returns for a given risk, i.e.  
 
2( [ ])p pMAX E R subject to σ γ=                                                                           (2) 
 
where, [ ]pE R  is the expected portfolio return, and 2pσ is the portfolio variance, i.e. 
risk. In the paper, however, we follow the other strategy, i.e. minimising portfolio 
risks for a given return: 
 
2( )pMIN σ                                                                                                                     (3) 
 
subject to: 
 
     [ ]pE R γ=                                                                                                             (3.1) 
      
1
1
n
i
i
w
=
=                                                                                                              (3.2) 
      0 1iw≤ ≤                                                                                                             (3.3)                                                
 
where: 
 
2
,
1 1
n n
p i j i j i j
i j
w wσ ρ σ σ
= =
=    (portfolio risk)                                                               (4.1) 
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[ ]i i iE R w r=                                                                                                                (4.2) 
ir  : returns on asset i                                                                                                 (4.3) 
iw : weight of asset i                                                                                                 (4.4) 
jw : weight of asset j                                                                                                 (4.5) 
,i jρ  : correlation between asset i and asset j                                                             (4.6) 
iσ : standard deviation of asset i                                                                               (4.7) 
jσ : standard deviation of asset j                                                                               (4.8) 
 
 
Solving Equation 3.1 could be achieved with the Lagrangian function. First, we set 
two Lagrangian multipliers, i.e. α and β , then Equation 3 is equivalent to the 
following equation: 
 
( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )L w f w w wα β α β= − −                                                                              (5.1) 
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or  
 
 
,
1 1 1 1
1 1
2
n n n n
i j i j i j i i i
i j i i
L w w w r wρ σ σ α γ β
= = = =
   
= − − − −   
   
                                          (5.2) 
 
0 1iw≤ ≤  
 
To find the solution of the Markowitz problem, we can differentiate Equation 5.2 with 
respect to iw  and set the subsequent first derivatives to zero. Therefore, we have the 
following four equations with the last equation being the constraint function: 
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Solutions to the above 4 equations will produce the weights we expect for an optimal 
portfolio, subject to restrictions, i.e. Equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
Above we described the mathematical procedure of finding the optimal weights, 
under Markowitz’s mean-variance approach. Behind this model is the common belief 
that the portfolio risk is lower, if more assets are included in a portfolio, especially 
when these assets are not correlated to each other. The reason is that, based on the 
mean-variance calculation procedure, the lesser correlation between assets leads to a 
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smaller value of 2pσ , as shown in Equation 3, given that expected returns are fixed. 
This reasoning, addressing the old wisdom to “Never put all eggs in one basket”, is 
particularly useful for portfolio management, since it lays out an evolutional 
theoretical foundation about how to undertake portfolio investment.  
 
In view of the fact that markets across countries are not correlated, or move in one 
direction, Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Solnik (1974; 1998), among others, extend 
Markowitz’s mean-variance framework into global investment. They believe that 
substantial advantages in risk reduction could be achieved by investing in foreign 
assets, as depicted in Figure 1. In this context, the total risk of a portfolio will depend 
on, not only the number of securities, but also most importantly the riskiness of each 
security, and the extent to which these individual securities are correlated to each 
other. In other words, a portfolio selection strategy of choosing 10 shares from one 
country is almost certain to be less desirable than another strategy of choosing 1 share 
from 10 different countries.  
 
In terms of the issue of pension funds’ asset allocation, it has been a norm to apply the 
mean-variance approach to find the optimal portfolio. For example, by incorporating 
liabilities into the analysis of optimal asset allocation, Yang (2003) seeks to quantify 
the gains from international diversification, and Inkmann and Blake (2004) identify 
the linkage between discount rates and asset alloction. Both studies are conducted 
under the mean-variance framework, which involves a maximisation of objective 
functions in the surplus of assets over liabilities in DB plans. It is worth noting that 
the mean-variance approach applies to both DC and DB plans. For both cases, some 
objective functions should be maximised, while the difference is that for the DC plan, 
we only consider the asset-side, while for the DB plan, pension liabilities should be 
included into the function. In this paper, we use a simple optimisation model as shown 
in Equation 2. Note that our analysis does not allow for liabilities; therefore, our 
results are more relevant to the DC plan. Implementation of the herein approach, 
however, needs some caution. For example, Britten-Jones (1999) finds that the sample 
error when estimating the weights of a global efficient portfolio is large, which might 
lead to sub-optimal asset allocation and results. 
 
5.2.2 Methodology 
 
One assumption of the mean-variance approach is that the returns are normally 
distributed, i.e. with a smooth bell-shaped probability distribution curve. If the returns 
are expected to have a normal distribution, the mean-variance framework holds that 
mean and variance are the only two statistics needed to characterise the distribution of 
asset returns. Thus, higher order moments of the distribution, i.e. skewness and 
kurtosis are not necessary to be considered in the portfolio optimisation construction. 
In addition, there are two arguments which do not strongly favour the use of higher 
moments of the distribution in portfolio analysis. First, from the purely statistical 
standpoint, higher moments or statistics involving higher powers of input data, are 
almost always less robust than lower moments (Cramer 1946). Secondly, individual 
and institutional investors might have different views on the importance of higher 
moments, i.e. mean-variance-skewness analysis (Amin and Kat 2004). Regarding 
individuals, as investors with relatively short investment horizon, they are more 
concerned about and vulnerable to short-term loss, therefore the mean-variance 
approach might not be appropriate. For institutional investors, e.g. pension funds, 
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however, they are well positioned to deal with any temporary large loss, since they are 
all long term investors (Davis and Steil 2001). 
 
A formal and widely used statistic to check normality is the Jarque-Bera statistic, 
which is expressed as Equation 7.1.  
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where S is the third-order moment of distribution, i.e. skewness in Equation 7.2, K is 
the fourth-order moment of distribution, i.e. kurtosis in Equation 7.3, and k is the 
number of estimated coefficients used to create the series. In addition, N is the 
number of observations, x  returns, and σ  the standard deviation. The JB statistic 
follows a Chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, under the null 
hypotheses of a normal distribution. Therefore, when data are normally distributed by 
not rejecting the JB statistic, we conclude that the mean-variance framework is an 
appropriate approach in the context of portfolio optimisation.   
 
In passing, skewness is a measurement of the symmetric distribution. It is expected to 
be zero if returns are normally distributed. Positive/negative skewness implies that the 
distribution has a long right/left tail. The fourth order moment of the distribution - 
kurtosis, measures the peakness or flatness of the distribution. We expect this statistic 
to be 3 for a normal distribution. If the value of kurtosis is greater than 3, the 
distribution is peaked (leptokurtic) relative to the normal, while it is flat (platykurtic) 
relative to the normal if the value is less than 3.  
 
Jarque-Bera statistics for all asset returns across both OECD countries and EMEs are 
given in Tables 5 and 6. For OECD countries, the null hypothesis of normality is 
frequently accepted across all classes of assets, except GBR and JPN. Results 
concerning EMEs have the similar picture, but we do have few outliers, i.e. ARG, 
IDN. The fact that Jarque-Bera statistics are less encouraging for EMEs than OECD 
might be due to the short observation period of our dataset. In the long run, however, 
we expect the asset returns for EMEs to be normally distributed, as they are in OECD 
countries. In addition, normality of most our data validates the simulation 
methodology used to patch up missing data, as noted in Section 5.1.  
 
After checking our data’s normality, and thus validating the appropriateness of the 
mean-variance approach, we move on to the portfolio optimisation. In this paper, we 
conduct two empirical studies; one relates to what quantitative benefits will be 
brought in, after the move from a regulatory regime prohibiting overseas investment 
only to a regime without such restrictions, while the other is concerned with what are 
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the optimal portfolios for each country at the national level, based on our dataset and 
methodology.  
 
To complete the first work, we design one statistic, i.e. rates of change (RC) in risk. 
RC is expressed in Equation 8.  
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σ ∗ is the standard deviation (SD) under the scenario of foreign investment restriction, 
a hypothesis consistent with the QAR, while σ  is the standard deviation under the 
scenario of allowing foreign investment, in line with the PPR (Davis 2002). Letter i is 
the country index. Lower case m refers to the start SD, while upper case M refers to 
the end SD. n is the number of intervals between m and M with the increment of 0.5% 
(Levy and Sarnat 1970). The formula is 
, ,
( ) / 0.5i i M i mn R R= − , where R is the return 
on the optimal portfolio, and Rm and RM correspond to the lowest and highest possible 
returns achieved in optimal portfolios. To make values of in  to be integers, we round 
the lowest and highest possible returns to the nearest integers. Meanwhile, in order to 
make our calculation in the optimisation process meaningful, all those portfolio 
returns used between 
,i MR and ,i mR  have to be available to both scenarios, i.e. a 
regime with investment overseas restriction and a regime without such restriction. It 
means implicitly that some possible returns available to the latter scenario cannot be 
achieved under the former scenario, and thus ignored in our calculation. In addition, it 
is worth noting that portfolio returns used to compute iRC  vary across countries (see 
Tables 7A till 10B).   
 
According to the above method, iRC  gives us the average risk-changes across n 
intervals for country i, after a hypothetical move from the QAR to the PPR. If the 
values of iRC  are negative, it indicates the positive effects, i.e. a drop in risk across 
all possible returns. Besides the risk-change ratio we introduced, we used another 
statistic, i.e. Sharpe ratio. Sharpe ratio is defined as the ratio of return to standard 
deviation; it is widely used as a measure of reward-to-risk. Normally, investors seek 
to have a portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio. We compute Sharpe ratios for both 
scenarios, i.e. the PPR and the QAR, and further calculated the percentage change in 
Sharpe ratios ( *RC ), in order to discern the pattern of Sharpe ratio movement. The 
mathematical formula is as follows: 
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If we assume that 
,i fR  and 
*
,i fR  equal zero, i.e. they are risk free assets, Equations 
9.2 and 9.3 are reduced to  
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Then, substituting Equations 9.4 and 9.5 into Equation 9.1, we have 
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Given that  
 
,i mR = 
*
,i mR                                                                                                                (9.7) 
 
and after some manipulations, e.g. cancelling the common terms, Equation 9.6 is 
reduced to  
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Positive values of *RC  indicate that Sharpe ratios increase, a desirable effect after 
relaxing pension fund’s foreign investment.  
 
The second empirical work relates to pension asset’s optimal allocation for each 
country under the PPR scenario. In this part, we consider returns in real term at 3 
levels, i.e. 5%, 7% and 9%. In order to check robustness of our results for both 
empirical studies, we conduct portfolio optimisation for different sub-samples. For 
example, for OECD countries, we first employ the dataset relating to the sub-sample 
period between 1966 and 1995, then incorporate the observations for the next year in 
sequence into the previous sub-sample dataset to obtain all the other 9 datasets. In 
total, we are expected to have 10 sets of results for each OECD country. For EMEs, 
given their less observations, we only use 5 sub-samples, and the first one ends in 
2000; the subsequent 4 sub-samples are obtained by adding one more year 
observations each time. It is noted, however, that for many countries, estimates for 
some particular sub-sample datasets are not available under the mean-variance 
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optimisation algorithm. In other words, 10/5 sets of optimisation results are not 
always computable for all OECD/EMEs countries at all three return levels (see the 
next section for details). Meanwhile, according to our methodology it is always 
certain that an investment approach with restrictions perform worse than that without 
those restrictions in terms of risk-return trade-off. However, it is interesting to 
investigate the quantitative magnitude of such diversification benefits. In addition, the 
extent to which such benefits varies across countries warrants a vigorous study. It is 
noted that all empirical work is conducted with Matlab 6.5. 
 
5.3 Empirical results 
 
5.3.1 Diversification benefit without foreign investment constraint 
 
In this part, we test the hypothesis whether pension fund portfolios can benefit from 
relaxing foreign investment restrictions. In other words, in Scenario I (QAR), 
investment in foreign assets, i.e. FEQ (foreign equity) and FB (foreign bonds) is not 
permitted, while in Scenario II (PPR) we assume that pension funds are allowed to 
invest in all classes of assets. For EMEs pension funds, the hypothetical portfolio 
includes 8 asset classes (except mortgage), while for OECD pension funds, all 9 asset 
classes are used, as mentioned in Section 5.1. According to Equation 8, the rates of 
change in risk, i.e. RC are calculated for each country, and these ratios are then 
averaged across different returns. It is noted again that the returns used to compute 
RC ratios for each country are in 0.5% increment, and the lower and upper bounds for 
each country are not the same across countries.  
 
Results for EMEs are presented in Tables 7A and 7B. Table 7A gives results relating 
to 5 sub-samples for the purpose of checking the results’ stability, as noted in the 
previous section, while Table 7B gives the statistical summary. As shown in both 
tables, regardless of sub-sample and country, all RC ratios are less than 0 (inclusive), 
which indicates the positive impact of the move from the QAR to the PPR, i.e. 
reduced portfolio risk for given returns. Despite consistent risk reduction for all 
EMEs, results show a large heterogeneity between these countries. For example, in 
terms of mean value across sub-samples as shown in Table 7B, PHL enjoys the 
largest benefit (-64.5%), and HKG has the smallest benefit (-8.6%). Specially, if the 
regulatory regime changes from the QAR to the PPR, investment risk could decrease 
by 65% for PHL pension funds and 8.6% for HKG pension funds, giving returns. The 
simple average of RC ratios across all EMEs is –33.4%, which means that on average 
pension investment without any restriction across borders will potentially have a risk, 
33.4% lower than the case where pension funds are not allowed to invest abroad. 
Even if IDN, IND, PAK, PER and PHL are excluded from our dataset, given concern 
about their relatively large figures, the mean of RC ratios is still high at the level of –
20.2%.  
The Sharpe ratio measures the extent to which high risk is rewarded by corresponding 
high return. We compute the rates of change in Sharpe ratios, based on Equation 9.8. 
Results are given in Tables 8A and 8B. All estimates are positive, and in some cases, 
the values are quite large. For example, based on estimates from all 5 sub-samples, 
Sharpe ratios for ARG pension funds are all well above 30%, with the highest value at 
190% when using the dataset ending in 2002. The average Sharpe ratio for ARG is 
93.6%, which implies that if ARG pension funds are permitted to invest overseas 
without any constraint, the Sharpe ratio could increase by 94%. When looking at the 
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overall picture of EMEs, on average the Sharpe ratio could increase by 92%, with a 
median value at 84%. When we exclude IDN, IND, PAK, PER and PHL, (their mean 
values are above 100%), the mean and median values decrease to 34% and 31% 
respectively, which are still sizeable, however. 
 
When turning to OECD countries, the results are similar, i.e. there is always a positive 
effect after the regulatory move from the QAR to the PPR. In terms of rates of change 
in risk, i.e. RC, Table 9A gives the full results, and the statistical summary is given in 
Table 9B. After averaging across sub-samples and countries, the value of the RC ratio 
is between –15.8% and –8.6%, with the median value at –11.2% and the mean at –
11.6%. For example, for UK pension funds, risk could decline hypothetically by 
14.4% under the PPR, compared to the QAR. The country which benefits most is 
PRT, i.e. risk could decrease by 63.4%. When excluding PRT from the dataset, the 
average RC across OECD countries is –8.7%. Regarding Sharpe ratios, results are 
shown in Tables 10A and 10B, and all estimates are as expected. For example, all 
figures in Table 10A are greater than 0 (inclusive), which indicates the positive 
impact of adopting the PPR. Countries which benefit significantly include FRA, GRE 
and PRT, among others.  Meanwhile, our results are robust across different sub-
samples. Concerning the statistical summary in Table 10B, the average across all 
OECD countries is 22.4%, while the figure without PRT is 13.9%.  
 
Statistics presented above give strong evidence in favour of the PPR investment 
approach. This policy benefits EMEs more than OECD countries. For example, on 
average, a QAR-PPR move will reduce investment risk by 33% for the former, and 
12% for the latter, as given in Table 11. At the same time, it will increase the Sharpe 
ratio by 92% for EMEs, and 92% for OECD countries. Similar results are obtained 
even if we exclude these countries with large figures from our dataset. Meanwhile, it 
is mentioned earlier that in order to complement our results, we run a number of 
variants, i.e. including or excluding some particular asset classes from our basic 
model. There are, i.e. a) with BL&MO, b) with MO, c) with BL, and d) with BL and 
MO but without PR. All statistical summaries are given in Table 11, in comparison to 
the results from our basic model. It is shown that there is a full consistency of 
negative effect on the RC (rate of change in risk), and positive effect on the RC* (rate 
of change in Sharpe ratio), following a shift from the QAR to the PPR. For example, 
for the With BL&MO and OECD case, the mean values of the RC are –9.0, -10.0, -
9.4 and –11.5, respectively. 
 
As given in Table 11, in general, there is a large impact on OECD countries than 
EMEs. Underlying reasons include market inefficiency, i.e. EMEs markets are not 
fully integrated between countries, and high volatility in domestic markets in EMEs. 
The issue is less serious for advanced OECD countries, as stock markets between 
those countries are highly linked to each other. For example, Davis (2005a) shows 
that the correlation of monthly percent changes in MSCI indices between US and UK 
is 0.51 over 1970-2002, while the figure rises to 0.64 over 1985-2002. Similar results, 
but with a longer observation period, are reported in Goetzmann et al (2005). The 
correlation between OECD countries and EMEs is much less, as markets in EMEs 
experience different business cycles from OECD, and some of them are relatively 
immune to shocks in the outside world. In addition, strict capital controls in emerging 
markets might explain this difference as well, which in turn is in line with the 
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arguments as regards international diversification benefits in Section 3 (Levy and 
Sarnat 1970; Backus et al 1992; Solnik 1998). 
 
5.3.2 Pension fund’s optimal portfolio composition 
 
Beside the issue of potential gains arising from international investments, another key 
issue is what proportion of pension funds should be invested in equities, and what 
proportion should be in bonds, etc. In this section, we seek to address the issue. In 
addition, given the dynamic structure of investment, we report results by using 10 
sub-samples, to see how results change.  
 
We conduct portfolio optimisation at 3 real return levels, namely 5%, 7% and 9%, for 
both OECD countries and EMEs. Under the mean-variance framework, as highlighted 
in Equation 3 in Section 5.2, we minimise variance or risk by fixing returns at these 
three values. Then, the optimal weights for each asset class are found, subject to the 
restrictions of disallowing short sales (Equation 3.3) and the total weights summing to 
unity (Equation 3.2). For some countries, particularly EMEs, due to the difficulty of 
accessing return data for some asset classes, we construct optimal portfolios only 
using available data. In addition, we analyse those countries which have data 
including CBY or GBY, EQY, FBY and FEQY at least, in that equity and bond are 
two of the most important investment vehicles in pension fund portfolios.  
 
Optimal portfolio results for EMEs pension funds are shown in Tables 12 through 14, 
and they vary significantly across countries. For example, in order to achieve a 5% 
real return, for PHL pension funds, ideally 79% should be allocated to government 
bonds, while for SGP pension funds, government bond investment is much lower, 
because its optimal share is 17%. The difference are due to the different asset return 
characteristics. In Table 4, statistics show that the average GBY for PHL is 6.3% with 
standard deviation at 1.1%, while those two figures are 2.7% and 12.6% for ZAF. In 
addition, we do not have CBY data for ZAF, which surely will have impact on the 
resultant portfolio compositions. Therefore, when explaining results reported in these 
data and comparing optimal weights between countries, it is more sensible to compare 
countries having same asset classes. On average, as shown in Table 12, for all EMEs 
at the 5% return level, 10% of pension funds should be allocated to corporate bonds, 
23% to government bonds, 4% to domestic equities, 30% to short-term assets, 14% to 
property, 0.8% to foreign equities, 18% to foreign bonds. All statistics here are 
standardised average, in order to make the sum of all components equal to 1. The 
formula is as follows:  
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SAV: standardised average 
AV: normal average across countries 
i: asset class 
 
Collectively, 19.1% of pension funds should be invested in foreign assets, including 
both foreign bonds and foreign equities. In addition, the combined equity investment 
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(domestic and foreign equities) share is 4.8%, and the combined bonds investment 
share is around 52%. When looking at the statistics related to all 16 EMEs, the trend 
is roughly the same.  
 
In order to discern the trend of changes in asset allocation with different return levels, 
we re-calculate optimal portfolios with two more return levels, i.e. 7% and 9%. 
Results are in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. Not surprisingly, asset compositions 
changed markedly for all EMEs. On average, the combined foreign asset share 
increases to 21% at the 7% return and peaks at 22% at the 9% return. As regards 
allocation to equities, it starts from 4.8% at the 5% return, rises to 6.7% at the 7% 
return, and further to 9.6% at the 9% return. This trend fits the financial theory well, 
in that it is widely recognised that a larger proportion of pension assets invested in 
high-yield assets, notably equities and foreign assets for EMEs will lead to a higher 
portfolio return. Meanwhile, for three cases, the combined bond investment (CB, GB 
and FB) share remains at a relatively high level, ranging 52% to 56%. In addition, we 
also notice that at the same level of returns, portfolio risk, as proxied by standard 
deviations (STDEV) differ sizeably between countries. For example, at the 5% return, 
STDEV is 4.9% for Chile, while it is 9.8% for South Africa. This large difference to 
some extent explains the market’s imperfect correlation between EMEs, and also the 
potential benefits of international investment.  
 
As noted earlier, optimal portfolio construction is a dynamic process and subject to 
ongoing changes. To this end, we calculate the optimal weights, using a number of 
different sub-samples. For EMEs, we employ 5 sample periods, with each ending in 
2000 through 2004. For the purpose of saving space, we will not report these results 
for all countries. We, however, report these detailed results for Singapore for the 
illustrative purpose. As given in Appendix 1, statistics remain stable in most cases, i.e. 
the optimal weights do not change too much when using different samples. For 
example, concerning the optimal allocation to government bonds (GB), standard 
deviation across 5 estimates under 7% return is quite small, i.e. 1.1%, implying a 
small change.   
 
OECD countries’ results are given in Tables 15 through 17. As shown in these 3 
tables, the optimal pension fund portfolios between OECD countries vary markedly. 
Again, it might be due to the different asset characteristics. As in the EMEs case, we 
compute the average portfolio compositions. By averaging asset shares across all 22 
OECD countries, we found that if a real return of 5% is required, 13.3% of pension 
funds should be allocated to foreign bonds and equities, while equities (both domestic 
and foreign) should have a 10.5% share. Domestic and foreign bond markets have 
49% of the pie as shown in Table 15. When we repeat the optimisation process with 
two other return levels, i.e. 7% and 9%, interesting results arise. Firstly, equity 
investment gains importance in terms of optimal allocation. For example, the share 
increases from 10.5% at 5% return to 25.8 at the 7% return, and further to 35.7% at 
the 9% return. The trend is the same as that in the EMEs case, i.e. equities (including 
both domestic and foreign assets) increase their weights in the optimal portfolios, 
when higher portfolio returns are required.  
 
Secondly, when the return requirement is low, e.g. 5%, foreign assets do not comprise 
a large share. When higher returns are demanded, however, more pension assets 
should be allocated to foreign assets. For example, for 3 return levels, i.e. 5%, 7% and 
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9%, the corresponding shares of foreign assets are 13.3%, 25.8% and 41.4%. This is 
consistent with the return characteristics presented in Table 3, where FEQY has the 
highest mean value, although it also has the highest standard deviation. Thirdly, when 
comparing OECD countries and EMEs in terms of optimal asset allocation to equities, 
it is shown that OECD pension funds favour equities more than pension funds in 
EMEs, particularly when higher returns are required. For example, at the 7% return, 
the optimal weights are 26% for OECD countries, and 7% for EMEs. It might be due 
to the high volatility related to emerging markets. For example, Tables 3 and 4 show 
that the standard deviation of domestic equity was 203.5% (all-country case) and 
41.7% (sub-sample case), while it is 31.3% for OECD countries. In other words, the 
increase in returns on both domestic and foreign equities for EMEs pension funds is 
not much enough to compensate the larger increase in volatility, i.e. investment risk. 
It is worth noting, however, our results are based on the historical data; therefore, if 
we forecast markets in EMEs will not be as volatile in the future as in the past, 
allocation to domestic and foreign equities should be higher.   
 
Fourthly, we find evidence of the importance of property investment for both pension 
fund portfolios in both OECD countries and EMEs. The results related to EMEs 
should be taken with caution, as we only have data for two countries. For OECD 
countries, at the 5% return level, the average property investment is 11%, but the 
figure increases to16% at the 7% return, and further to 22% when the return required 
is 9%. This finding is consistent with the arguments by Booth and Matysiak (2001), 
and Booth (2002), who argue that real estate has a low correlation with other asset 
classes, and thus the large scope of diversification scope.  
 
Fifthly, we combine all portfolio returns and corresponding standard deviations (SD) 
in Table 18. It is indicated that in order to achieve the same level of portfolio returns, 
different risks should be sacrificed across countries. For example, for Australia, the 
SD is 5.0% at the 5% return, while it increases to 9.9% at the 7% return, and 16.0% at 
the 9% return. On average, these 3 values are 3.5%, 7.3% and 12.2% for OECD 
countries. In comparison, pension funds in EMEs have small values on the SD for 
each portfolio return level, as given in Table 18. The smaller SD associated with 
EMEs seems counterintuitive. However, it is exactly consistent with our results 
presented in the previous sections, i.e. the larger beneficial impacts for EMEs pension 
funds from global investment. In addition, 
,i jρ  for EMEs (correlation between asset i 
and asset j) is very likely to be less than 
,i jρ  for OECD countries, and in some cases, 
the former might be negative. In consequence, portfolio risk, as shown by 2pρ  in 
Equation 4.1 for EMEs pension funds should be lower than OECD pension funds.  
 
Sixthly, as in the EMEs case, we calculate optimal portfolio composition for different 
samples. But given the concern of saving space, we do not present these results for all 
countries. Instead, we report results relating to the UK pension funds as an example. 
In general, results, as shown in Appendix 2, only change slightly between sample 
periods. This is revealed by the small value of standard deviations. 
  
Last, before moving to the next section, we talk about briefly the results relating to the 
four variants, i.e. a) with BL&MO, b) with MO, c) with BL, and d) with BL&MO but 
without PR. Results are given in Table 19. On average, when higher portfolio returns 
are required, more assets are allocated to high return assets, i.e. domestic equity, 
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property, and foreign bond and equity. This is consistent with our earlier results with 
the basic model. However, it is also noticed that allocation to bank loans frequently 
dominates in the portfolios; this implausible result is the main reason we drop BL 
from our basic model. In addition, MO becomes dominant in the second scenario, i.e. 
without BL, which again leads us to drop MO from our basic model.  
 
5.3.3 Comparison between actual portfolios and optimal portfolios 
 
In the previous section we presented the results of optimal portfolios for each country. 
An immediate question is how our results differ from the actual portfolios. Table 21 
gives the comparison results for selected 6 OECD countries. A quick look shows that 
the actual pension fund portfolios differ from our results for all countries, with the 
degree of difference varying across countries. For example, as to the UK pension 
funds, optimally 22.9% should be allocated to domestic equities when the required 
return is 9%. The actual portfolio, however, shows that 35.9% was invested in 
domestic equities as of 2003. Concerning foreign investment, 18.2% was allocated to 
foreign equities and 4.2% was to foreign bonds in the actual portfolios. In 
comparison, our optimisation results show that 27.4% should be invested in foreign 
equities, and 37.7% in foreign bonds. The difference indicates that the UK pension 
funds could benefit from more international investment. This under-investment in 
foreign assets is also observable for AUS, CAN and USA, as shown in Table 21. For 
JPN and CHE, however, we find evidence of over-investment in foreign assets. For 
example, for JPN, the optimal allocation to foreign equities and bonds should be 
8.5%, while in the reality, 27% was allocated to international assets.   
 
When explaining our results, however, caution is needed. Firstly, our results are based 
on historical data; therefore, given the fact that pension fund investment is a dynamic 
and ongoing process, new data should be added into the old dataset, whenever they 
become available. In other words, what happened in the past should be considered 
only as a rough guide of what will happen in the future. Secondly, in the actual 
pension portfolios, there is a special asset class, i.e. “others”, while in the optimal 
portfolios we assume that allocation to “others” is zero. Therefore, this unrealistic 
assumption will affect the accurateness of our comparison.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
People are living longer and healthier lives, and the issue of how to tackle the problem 
of the ageing population has been at the top of government’s agenda. The current 
trend concerning the social security system is the shift from unfunded schemes, e.g. 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funded schemes, e.g. the World Bank model (Hu 2005a). 
Givn the funded nature of the new pension schemes, pension fund assets have and are 
expected to increase significantly in the following decades. Hu (2005b) gives 
estimates that as of 2003, pension fund assets were equal to US$ 15 trillion for 19 
advanced OECD countries, and they were equivalent to US$ 390 billion within 36 
EMEs.  
 
With the rapid accumulation of pension assets, one very important issue relates to 
pension fund management. In this paper, we sought to address the issue, and 
particularly focused on the arguments relating to the prudent person rule (PPR) and 
the quantitative asset restriction (QAR), in terms of pension fund international 
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investment (Davis 2005a, 2005b).  We used a unique dataset covering returns on 9 
different assets, i.e. short-term asset yields (MPY), bank loans yields (BLY), 
mortgages yields (MOY), domestic corporate bond yields (CBY), domestic 
government bond yields (GBY), domestic equity yields (EQY), property yields 
(PRY), foreign equity yields (FEQY), and foreign bond yields (FBY). In addition, our 
dataset includes 39 countries (17 EMEs and 22 OECD) with the observation period 
ranging from 1966 to 2004. To our knowledge, it is by far the largest database from 
which optimal portfolios are derived. Under the mean-variance framework 
(Markowitz 1959), we found a number of interesting and important results, which 
contributed to the current pensions literature.   
 
First, the results of RC (rate of change in risk) ratios, which we designed in the paper, 
indicated that the QAR investment approach, limiting international investment, on 
average materially increases pension fund’s risk for given returns. This finding 
applies to pension funds in both OECD countries and EME, with a larger effect on the 
latter.  
 
Second, it was found that the shift from the PPR to QAR jeopardized the reward-to-
risk, i.e. the Sharpe ratio. Again, the negative impact was more serious for EME 
pension funds than OECD funds.  
 
Third, due to the different asset return characteristics (Davis 2005a), optimal pension 
fund portfolio compositions found in the paper varied markedly across countries. We, 
however, found that if higher portfolio returns are required, more investment in 
equities and foreign assets are needed, which is consistent with financial theory.  
 
Fourth, as the higher proportion of foreign assets is required to achieve higher returns, 
the majority of increase in foreign assets is accounted for by foreign bonds for EMEs, 
while the trend is not discernable for OECD countries.  
 
Last but not least, our statistics suggested the importance of property investment in 
pension fund portfolio optimisation, and the results were applicable to both OECD 
countries and EMEs. It might serve as empirical findings supporting the arguments of 
Booth (2002).  
 
In summary, in the paper, we found results which are in favour of the prudent person 
rule (PPR) investment approach and against the quantitative asset constraint (QAR) 
approach in terms of foreign investment. Also, our findings frequently recognised the 
potential large benefit arising from international investment for pension funds in 
EMEs. One caution, however is that in order to take advantage of the diversification 
benefit available for EMEs, they have to meet some pre-conditions (Davis 2005b; 
Blake 2003b, b; Hu 2005c). For example, there should have a sound banking systems, 
relatively developed securities markets, experienced regulations, etc. Without these 
minimum conditions, it is hardly to achieve the large benefit as identified in this 
paper.  
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Table 1 Observation period, data source for different assets, OECD countries 
(22)   
 CBY GBY EQY BLY MPY MOY PRY FEQYa FBYa Periodb 
AUS 1967-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1975-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1974-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
AUT  1966-2004 1970-2004  1966-2004  1990-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD  GFD  DS    
BEL  1966-2004 1966-2004 1981-2004 1966-2004  1988-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD  DS    
CAN 1967-2003 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1967-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 CB&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
CHE 1967-2004 1966-2004 1967-2004 1981-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
DEU 1967-1995 1966-2004 1966-2004 1978-2002 1966-2004 1967-2002 1967-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
DNK 1967-1995 1966-2004 1967-2004 1978-2002 1966-2004 1966-2004 1985-1995 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
ESP 1986-1998 1966-2004 1966-2004 1978-2002 1966-2004  1988-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD  DS    
FIN  1966-2004 1966-2004 1977-2002 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD      
FRA 1983-1998 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1981-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
GBR 1967-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1967-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1967-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
GRE  1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  Madsen&CB GFD WDI GFD      
IRL  1966-2004 1966-2004 1975-2003 1966-2004  1987-2002 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD&Madsen WDI GFD  DS    
ITA 1983-1998 1966-2004 1966-2004 1978-2003 1966-2004 1966-2004 1985-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS GFD GFD WDI GFD  DS    
JPN 1967-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1967-2004 1967-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
LUX  1970-1998 1966-2004 1980-1998 1980-1998   1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  CB GFD&Madsen WDI CB      
NLD 1968-1998 1966-2004 1966-2004 1967-2004 1966-2004 1967-1995 1967-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD Davis DS&Davis    
NOR  1966-2004 1966-2004 1979-2004 1966-2004  1985-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD  DS    
NZL  1966-2004 1966-2004 1977-2004 1966-2004 1980-2004 1990-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD&Madsen WDI GFD CB DS    
PRT  1976-2004 1966-2004 1976-1999 1966-2004  1991-2001 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
  GFD GFD&Madsen WDI GFD  DS    
SWE 1967-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1970-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1981-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 DS&Davis GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
USA 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1981-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1966-2004 
 GFD GFD GFD WDI GFD CB&Davis DS&Davis    
Source: CB: national central banks, Davis: Davis and Steil (2001), DS: Datastream, GFD (Global 
Financial Data), Madsen: Jakob Madsen, WDI (World Development Indicators 2005). CBY, corporate 
bond yield, GBY, government bond yield, EQY, equity yield, BLY, bond loan yield, MPY, short-term 
asset yield, MOY, mortgage yield, PRY, property yield, FEQY, foreign equity yield, and FBY, foreign 
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bond yield; blank entries mean data are not available; a, FEQY and FBY are calculated by the author; 
b, observation period for all asset classes for each country after filling in these years data are not 
available by simulation (see main text for detail); all returns are in real term, i.e. adjusted for inflation. 
 
Table 2 Observation period, data source for different assets, EMEs (17) 
 CBY GBY EQY BLY MPY MOY PRY FEQYa FBYa Periodb 
ARG 1993-2004 1992-2004 1988-2004 1994-2003 1978-2004  1994-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS GFD GFD WDI GFD  DS    
BRA 1993-2004  1988-2004 1997-2004    1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS  GFD WDI       
CHL  1990-2004 1983-2004 1977-2003 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1990-2004 
  CB GFD WDI GFD      
CHN  1993-2004 1993-2004 1980-2004    1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
  DS DS WDI       
HKG  1994-2004 1973-2004 1990-2004 1968-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD      
IDN 1997-2004  1991-2004 1986-2003 1973-2003  1991-2003 1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS  GFD WB GFD  DS    
IND  1966-2004 1988-2004 1986-2004 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1988-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD      
ISR  1994-2004 1993-2004  1987-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
  GFD GFD  GFD      
KOR 1992-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1980-2004 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS GFD GFD WDI GFD      
MEX 1993-2004 1995-2004 1988-2004 1993-2004 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS GFD GFD WDI GFD      
MYS  1966-2004 1973-2004 1987-2004 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1987-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD      
PAK  1966-2004 1988-2004  1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1988-2004 
  GFD GFD  GFD      
PER 1997-2004  1994-2004 1986-2004    1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS  GFD WDI       
PHL 1997-2004 1994-2003 1982-2004 1976-2003 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1991-2004 
 DS GFD GFD WDI GFD      
SGP  1988-2004 1973-2004 1978-2004 1966-2004  1985-2004 1973-2004 1973-2004 1988-2004 
  GFD GFD WDI GFD  DS    
THA 1998-2004 1976-2004 1976-2004 1976-2004 1966-2004  1992-1999 1973-2004 1973-2004 1976-2004 
 DS GFD&DS GFD WDI GFD  DS    
ZAF 1997-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004 1966-2004   1973-2004 1973-2004 1973-2004 
 DS GFD GFD WDI GFD      
Source: CB: national central banks, Davis: Davis and Steil (2001), DS: Datastream, GFD (Global 
Financial Data), Madsen: Jakob Madsen, WDI (World Development Indicators 2005). CBY, corporate 
bond yield, GBY, government bond yield, EQY, equity yield, BLY, bond loan yield, MPY, short-term 
asset yield, MOY, mortgage yield, PRY, property yield, FEQY, foreign equity yield, and FBY, foreign 
bond yield; blank entries mean data are not available; a, FEQY and FBY are calculated by the author; 
b, observation period for all asset classes for each country after filling in these years data are not 
available by simulation (see main text for detail); all returns are in real term, i.e. adjusted for inflation.  
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Table 3 Statistical summary of real asset returns in %, OECD countries (22) 
  CBY GBY EQY BLY MPY MOY PRY FEQY FBY 
AUS Mean 6.6 4.0 9.7 5.9 2.5 3.7 5.3 10.2 6.3 
 SDa 21.2 11.3 24.2 4.1 4.0 3.8 16.6 26.7 16.0 
AUT Mean  5.1 7.6  2.7  0.1 6.5 2.4 
 SD  11.1 29.0  2.1  6.9 26.6 13.5 
BEL Mean  4.7 7.9 7.2 3.2  3.4 7.8 3.7 
 SD  9.0 20.9 1.8 2.7  18.1 26.8 14.4 
CAN Mean 6.7 4.7 6.0 4.0 2.8 5.0 6.9 9.3 3.7 
 SD 13.3 10.4 16.4 2.5 2.8 2.4 8.6 24.2 14.4 
CHE Mean 7.0 3.1  2.9 0.4 1.9 1.1 5.1 1.3 
 SD 21.6 17.6  1.3 2.2 2.1 7.9 27.0 14.2 
DEU Mean 3.8 4.8 6.9 7.5 1.7 4.3 6.6 6.4 2.5 
 SD 15.5 7.9 23.9 1.4 2.0 1.6 13.4 26.0 13.5 
DNK Mean 5.3 6.8 11.6 7.3 4.7 5.7 13.9 6.5 4.2 
 SD 12.2 14.5 32.8 2.0 4.7 3.3 14.9 26.6 13.3 
ESP Mean 3.1 3.7 8.8 4.2 1.2  13.7 11.2 7.1 
 SD 4.6 15.4 29.5 3.7 4.5  38.2 28.0 14.7 
FIN Mean  4.6 16.9 3.5 3.1  11.6 9.2 5.2 
 SD  8.2 41.8 3.3 4.4  12.9 28.0 14.2 
FRA Mean 5.7 4.5 8.8 3.3 2.7 3.7 4.3 8.7 4.7 
 SD 1.3 11.3 26.4 3.0 2.7 2.0 12.2 25.7 14.0 
GBR Mean 4.1 3.5 10.1 1.8 -0.1 2.8 13.5 9.1 5.6 
 SD 13.1 8.5 29.5 4.3 6.0 4.5 62.6 25.2 13.4 
GRE Mean  5.2 11.7 4.7 0.0   15.9 12.0 
 SD  6.9 56.5 6.8 5.4   28.6 15.3 
IRL Mean  4.2 10.1 2.7 -0.6  24.2 10.2 6.2 
 SD  15.9 35.8 4.8 6.7  54.3 26.6 13.3 
ITA Mean 2.7 4.5 5.6 6.0 2.6  7.0 11.9 7.4 
 SD 3.5 17.2 32.6 3.6 3.7  30.0 27.2 14.0 
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JPN Mean 6.4 3.6 7.8 2.0 0.3 2.9 8.5 4.7 0.8 
 SD 15.8 8.8 28.6 3.4 3.6 3.6 28.9 20.5 12.7 
LUX Mean  2.9 10.5 4.1 4.6   7.8 3.7 
 SD  2.8 31.4 1.8 1.9   26.8 14.4 
NLD Mean 5.1 4.2 9.8 5.9 1.6 4.4 3.0 6.7 2.8 
 SD 18.7 9.2 24.2 3.2 3.4 2.3 10.1 26.2 13.4 
NOR Mean  2.8 10.7 6.6 2.5  16.4 8.7 4.7 
 SD  8.3 41.9 2.8 3.6  47.9 27.2 12.8 
NZL Mean  2.5 6.1 4.4 2.7 5.7 -2.5 10.6 6.7 
 SD  13.6 31.2 7.5 4.9 3.5 19.7 26.7 15.8 
PRT Mean  4.0 12.0 4.1 -1.1  -2.2 14.7 10.7 
 SD  20.8 53.6 7.0 6.0  22.4 28.8 16.2 
SWE Mean 4.2 3.9 12.5 5.3 2.4 4.1 -1.8 10.0 6.1 
 SD 14.0 9.3 29.2 3.0 3.3 2.9 45.5 28.2 14.7 
USA Mean 4.6 3.7 7.1 3.8 1.5 4.4 3.5 5.7 2.6 
 SD 10.1 11.9 17.6 2.5 2.2 2.8 17.9 19.7 6.5 
Memo:           
Average mean  5.0 4.1 9.4 4.6 1.9 4.0 6.8 8.9 5.0 
Average SD  12.7 11.4 31.3 3.5 3.8 2.9 24.4 26.2 13.9 
Source and Key: see Table 1; blank entries mean data are not available; a, standard deviation. 
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Table 4 Statistical summary of real asset returns in %, EMEs (17) 
  CBY GBY EQY BLY MPY MOY PRY FEQY FBY 
ARG Mean 10.2 -2.3 -315.2 12.4 212.2  17.0 314.4 316.7 
 SDa 11.6 20.7 890.4 8.2 1255.2  71.9 804.1 824.1 
BRA Mean -333.5  -332.3 60.7    342.5 342.5 
 SD 775.1  1948.5 13.7    610.2 618.3 
CHL Mean  -3.0 24.3 17.1 -56.1   80.5 76.6 
 SD  5.9 42.0 16.0 111.9   174.9 176.0 
CHN Mean  1.0 4.5 2.7    13.3 9.3 
 SD  4.6 30.8 5.9    25.5 16.7 
HKG Mean  5.6 13.5 3.9 -1.2   9.5 5.6 
 SD  13.2 43.4 5.4 6.7   25.1 11.8 
IDN Mean -1.0  -6.8 10.0 1.1  -13.2 22.6 18.6 
 SD 16.9  45.6 9.6 9.8  14.2 50.9 45.3 
IND Mean  0.4 13.9 7.1 1.6   14.4 10.4 
 SD  9.8 32.1 2.4 5.7   26.8 14.3 
ISR Mean  6.3 6.9  1.1   55.3 52.1 
 SD  7.0 29.6  7.9   92.0 90.7 
KOR Mean 6.5 13.6 20.5 3.9 6.6   12.3 8.4 
 SD 5.5 19.2 40.7 4.1 6.3   26.3 15.2 
MEX Mean -5.5 30.9 25.0 7.3 4.4  -14.5 38.1 34.4 
 SD 9.7 46.0 43.3 6.4 14.7  81.0 56.1 52.2 
MYS Mean  4.0 9.2 6.1 1.1   9.6 5.7 
 SD  8.0 35.0 1.3 3.3   27.0 14.4 
PAK Mean  2.0 21.2  0.6   14.8 10.7 
 SD  13.8 63.7  5.4   25.8 13.1 
PER Mean 5.3  12.0 -235.1    348.0 352.2 
 SD 3.6  36.3 752.9    1248.7 1294.8 
PHL Mean 4.1 6.3 16.6 5.5 2.5   15.9 11.9 
 SD 2.3 1.1 68.6 6.4 7.5   27.9 17.6 
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SGP Mean  2.9 6.0 5.0 1.0  14.1 7.0 3.0 
 SD  3.8 33.3 1.6 4.6  44.7 25.4 12.1 
THA Mean 5.7 7.0 16.5 7.2 2.7  -15.9 10.7 6.7 
 SD 2.5 10.6 50.6 3.8 4.8  51.7 25.2 13.7 
ZAF Mean 1.3 2.7 9.8 4.6 -5.1   16.0 12.1 
 SD 2.7 12.6 25.2 4.9 5.9   28.9 20.3 
Memob:           
Average mean  -34.1 5.5 -26.7 -5.4 12.3  -2.5 77.9 75.1 
Average SD  92.2 12.6 203.5 56.2 103.6  52.7 194.2 191.2 
Memoc:           
Average mean  1.9 6.9 12.1 5.8 1.4  -7.4 18.4 14.5 
Average SD  6.6 12.5 41.7 4.7 6.9  47.9 35.6 25.9 
Source and Key: see Table 2; blank entries mean data are not available; a, standard deviation; b, refers to all EMEs; c, refers to all  
EMEs, excluding ARG, BRA, CHL and PER.  
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Table 5 Jarque-Bera statistics for normal distribution test, OECD countries (22) 
  BLY CBY EQY FBY FEQY GBY MOY MPY PRY No. of siga 
AUS JBb 3.51 37.91* 0.80 0.37 0.68 0.34 1.28 1.14 0.33 1 
AUT JB   67.61* 1.50 1.30 0.69  0.27 2.59 1 
BEL JB 1.57  0.66 0.46 1.15 1.00  4.17 13.95* 1 
CAN JB 0.39 2.28 0.75 0.46 3.33 1.36 0.88 0.17 2.12 0 
CHE JB 10.08* 2.48 0.35 1.31 0.77 1.47 5.97* 4.29 3.10 1 
DEU JB 8.91* 1.59 0.58 1.38 1.48 0.87 2.17 7.96** 3.58 2 
DNK JB 1.16 0.23 0.83 1.31 0.06 0.25 0.86 0.84 1.00 0 
ESP JB 1.17 0.41 5.70 0.23 1.21 37.70* 1.68 2.08 1.00 1 
FIN JB 0.91  25.26* 0.24 12.40* 1.73  0.88  2 
FRA JB 3.71 1.16 1.30 0.31 1.71 1.41 2.10 0.47 0.81 0 
GBR JB 36.15* 26.11* 57.98* 0.20 8.26* 0.86 29.93* 13.59* 20.05* 7 
GRE JB 1.33  47.79* 1.31 0.74 2.45  5.39  1 
IRL JB 2.27  0.78 0.61 4.09 0.60  3.32 5.10 0 
ITA JB 1.98 0.71 9.23* 1.42 12.35* 1.54  0.89 1.04 2 
JPN JB 278.84* 17.66* 10.14* 0.03 0.63 7.32* 234.99* 171.20* 1.37 6 
LUX JB 0.28  55.87* 0.40 1.13 1.33  2.00  1 
NLD JB 0.95 20.99* 1.41 1.52 1.33 26.90* 1.97 1.60 3.55 2 
NOR JB 0.47  50.40* 0.58 2.67 0.30  0.50 12.52* 2 
NZL JB 8.15*  18.06* 0.49 0.11 0.24 3.57 2.04 2.94 2 
PRT JB 4.89  24.29* 1.20 0.97 1.35  22.97* 1.10 2 
SWE JB 0.85 2.65 1.73 1.17 19.79* 1.49 0.80 2.07 5.34 1 
USA JB 1.32 0.10 2.13 12.49* 20.32* 4.26 0.31 0.29 24.09* 3 
Source: own calculations; key, see Table 1; blank entries mean data are not available; a, significant against null hypothesis of normality at 5%; b, JB: Jarque-Bera statistics. 
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Table 6 Jarque-Bera statistics for normal distribution test, EMEs (17) 
  BLY CBY EQY FBY FEQY GBY MOY MPY PRY No. of siga 
ARG JBb 1.86 6.98* 19.42* 25.95* 7.97* 12.98*  41.31* 4.91 6 
BRA JB 1.11 7.19* 6.08* 5.60 5.70     2 
CHL JB 8.86*  1.53 2.90 3.28 3.25  3.31  1 
CHN JB 7.10*  0.97 1.19 2.35 3.93    1 
HKG JB 0.82  1.88 4.12 1.40 0.88  0.90  0 
IDN JB 34.92* 0.35 0.89 56.95* 35.77*   25.33*  4 
IND JB 6.62*  0.91 0.46 0.59 2.82  1.12  1 
ISR JB   0.59 0.63 3.32 0.53  1.16  0 
KOR JB 0.81 8.69* 0.71 1.88 0.76 2.99  1.58  1 
MEX JB 7.61* 2.53 0.93 44.20* 1.75 5.00  10.65*  3 
MYS JB 13.64*  1.93 12.51* 0.36 1.61  0.90  2 
PAK JB   5.91* 5.16 0.33 12.12  0.82  1 
PER JB 53.19*  0.80 52.44* 28.05* 0.72    3 
PHL JB 2.40 0.16 9.10* 0.50 0.46 0.72  0.40  1 
SGP JB 6.08*  4.86 12.57* 0.07 0.03  0.88 0.86 2 
THA JB 2.27  2.91 0.67 0.40 54.33*  4.90  1 
ZAF JB 1.31  2.58 0.90 0.58 1.32  5.80  0 
Source: own calculations; key, see Table 2; blank entries mean data are not available; a, significant against null hypothesis of normality at 5%; b, JB: Jarque-Bera statistics. 
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Table 7A Rate of change (%) in risk (EMEs), from the QAR to the PPR 
EMEs 
Return 
boundsa ~2004b ~2003 ~2002 ~2001 ~2000 
ARG [10,27] -42.5 -40.4 -49.3 -26.3 -33.6 
CHL [4,17] -47.4 -56.4 -63.4 -54.3 -51.7 
HKG [4,21] -6.7 -7.0 -9.1 -8.6 -11.4 
IDN [6,8]     -23.9 -23.9 -32.8 
IND [7,15.5] -53.2 -51.2 -58.0 -61.2 -50.2 
ISR [5,8] -31.1 -31.4 -28.3 -5.6 -38.2 
KOR [5,13] -4.1 -6.3 -1.5 -13.3 -17.3 
MEX [4,40] -15.2 -16.0 -15.2 -15.6 -20.2 
MYS [4,11] -18.6 -18.4 -15.6 -14.2 -20.9 
PAK [4,21] -54.6 -54.3 -59.5 -73.9 -76.7 
PER [6,64] -61.3 -62.4       
PHL [6,12] -64.9 -64.1       
SGP [3,15] -11.7 -10.3 -8.4 -9.6 -7.7 
THA [8,17] -17.5 -14.8 -19.6 -24.7 -33.9 
ZAF [0,9] -26.6 -26.5 -26.7 -26.2 -27.3 
Note: a, lower and upper bounds of portfolio returns, (they are not necessarily same across countries); 
b, refers to the last year of the sub-sample 
 
Table 7B Rate of change (%) in risk (EMEs), from the QAR to the PPR 
EMEs Min Max Median Mean SDa 
ARG -49.3 -26.3 -40.4 -38.4 8.8 
CHL -63.4 -47.4 -54.3 -54.6 6.0 
HKG -11.4 -6.7 -8.6 -8.6 1.9 
IDN -32.8 -23.9 -23.9 -26.9 5.1 
IND -61.2 -50.2 -53.2 -54.8 4.7 
ISR -38.2 -5.6 -31.1 -26.9 12.4 
KOR -17.3 -1.5 -6.3 -8.5 6.6 
MEX -20.2 -15.2 -15.6 -16.4 2.1 
MYS -20.9 -14.2 -18.4 -17.6 2.7 
PAK -76.7 -54.3 -59.5 -63.8 10.7 
PER -62.4 -61.3 -61.9 -61.9 0.8 
PHL -64.9 -64.1 -64.5 -64.5 0.5 
SGP -11.7 -7.7 -9.6 -9.6 1.6 
THA -33.9 -14.8 -19.6 -22.1 7.5 
ZAF -27.3 -26.2 -26.6 -26.6 0.4 
AVERAGE -39.4 -28.0 -32.9 -33.4 4.8 
AVERAGEb -26.3 -14.2 -20.0 -20.2 4.9 
Note: a, standard deviation; b, average without CHL, IND, PAK, PER and PHL. 
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Table 8A Rate of change (%) in Sharpe ratio (EMEs), from the QAR to the PPR 
EMEs 
Return 
boundsa ~2004b ~2003 ~2002 ~2001 ~2000 
ARG [10,27] 101.3 86.7 189.8 37.8 52.6 
CHL [4,17] 104.4 142.7 185.1 128.5 115.2 
HKG [4,21] 7.8 8.2 10.9 10.0 13.8 
IDN [6,8]   31.5 31.5 49.0 
IND [7,15.5] 121.5 113.3 160.9 164.1 108.7 
ISR [5,8] 45.7 46.3 39.4 6.0 125.5 
KOR [5,13] 4.3 7.0 1.6 16.2 22.4 
MEX [4,40] 20.5 21.7 20.5 20.7 29.3 
MYS [4,11] 25.6 25.3 21.1 19.3 31.8 
PAK [4,21] 145.8 142.9 181.7 394.5 379.7 
PER [6,64] 165.8 166.8    
PHL [6,12] 312.6 391.7    
SGP [3,15] 14.3 12.6 10.1 11.2 8.7 
THA [8,17] 23.4 18.9 29.4 44.2 67.3 
ZAF [0,9] 42.6 34.1 35.0 51.7 48.3 
Note: a, lower and upper bounds of portfolio returns, (they are not necessarily same across countries); 
b, refers to the last year of the sub-sample 
 
Table 8B Rate of change (%) in Sharpe ratio (EMEs), from the QAR to the PPR 
EMEs Min Max Median Mean SDa 
ARG 37.8 189.8 86.7 93.6 59.5 
CHL 104.4 185.1 128.5 135.2 31.4 
HKG 7.8 13.8 10.0 10.2 2.4 
IDN 31.5 49.0 31.5 37.4 10.1 
IND 108.7 164.1 121.5 133.7 26.7 
ISR 6.0 125.5 45.7 52.6 44.0 
KOR 1.6 22.4 7.0 10.3 8.7 
MEX 20.5 29.3 20.7 22.5 3.8 
MYS 19.3 31.8 25.3 24.6 4.9 
PAK 142.9 394.5 181.7 248.9 127.2 
PER 165.8 166.8 166.3 166.3 0.7 
PHL 312.6 391.7 352.1 352.1 56.0 
SGP 8.7 14.3 11.2 11.4 2.2 
THA 18.9 67.3 29.4 36.6 19.6 
ZAF 34.1 51.7 42.6 42.3 7.8 
AVERAGE 68.0 126.5 84.0 91.9 27.0 
AVERAGEb 18.1 59.5 31.4 34.1 16.3 
Note: a, standard deviation; b, average without CHL, IND, PAK, PER and PHL 
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Table 9A Rate of change (%) in risk (OECD), from the QAR to the PPR 
OECD 
Return 
boundsa ~2004b ~2003 ~2002 ~2001 ~2000 ~1999 ~1998 ~1997 ~1996 ~1995 
AUS [5, 8] -10.0 -13.7 -14.2 -17.7 -17.2 -18.2 -15.6 -13.8 -15.3 -18.2 
AUT [3, 5] 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.8 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CAN [5, 6] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -3.1 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -1.5 
CHE [3, 8] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DEU [6, 7] 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DNK [8, 13] -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ESP [6, 13] -7.0 -9.6 -13.1 -17.3 -18.2 -13.8 -8.4 -11.5 -14.9 -20.3 
FIN [4, 16] -1.7 -2.4 -4.4 -5.0 -4.3 -2.3 -2.1 -2.5 -1.9 -2.8 
FRA [6, 6.5] -15.2 -17.7 -20.7 -16.8 -14.4 -13.7 -19.4 -26.9 -30.9 -46.3 
GBR [3, 13] -11.4 -11.8 -16.1 -14.6 -13.4 -14.7 -15.4 -13.5 -14.1 -19.2 
GRE [2, 6.5] -19.0 -19.8 -21.6 -28.6 -33.3 -33.9 -39.4 -42.0 -42.1 -48.0 
IRL [4, 24] -19.1 -21.6 -24.3 -28.8 -27.6 -26.2 -24.7 -24.9 -26.8 -29.5 
JPN [2.5, 8] -0.9 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -2.4 -2.3 -2.6 -1.4 -0.6 
LUX [5, 10] -0.9 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -2.4 -2.3 -2.6 -1.4 -0.6 
NLD [5.5, 9] 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NOR [6, 17] -15.5 -14.7 -15.1 -19.3 -20.5 -19.3 -17.8 -13.3 -13.9 -14.2 
PRT [3, 10.5] -61.8 -62.8 -64.3 -64.2 -63.4 -63.9 -61.0 -62.0 -64.0 -66.7 
SWE [5.5, 12] -6.4 -8.2 -12.7 -9.3 -6.9 -4.8 -5.9 -5.6 -5.5 -9.5 
USA [2, 7] -2.7 -1.6 -1.3 -0.8 -1.3 -1.7 -1.6 -2.1 -2.8 -3.0 
Note: a, lower and upper bounds of portfolio returns, (they are not necessarily same across countries); b, refers to the last year of the sub-sample
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Table 9B Rate of change (%) in risk (OECD), from the QAR to the PPR 
OECD Min Max Median Mean SDa 
AUS -18.2 -10.0 -15.4 -15.4 2.6 
AUT -1.8 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.7 
CAN -3.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 1.0 
CHE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DEU -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
DNK -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 
ESP -20.3 -7.0 -13.5 -13.4 4.4 
FIN -5.0 -1.7 -2.4 -2.9 1.2 
FRA -46.3 -13.7 -18.5 -22.2 10.1 
GBR -19.2 -11.4 -14.4 -14.4 2.2 
GRE -48.0 -19.0 -33.6 -32.8 10.3 
IRL -29.5 -19.1 -25.5 -25.3 3.2 
JPN -2.6 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 0.8 
LUX -2.6 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 0.8 
NLD -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NOR -20.5 -13.3 -15.3 -16.4 2.6 
PRT -66.7 -61.0 -63.7 -63.4 1.6 
SWE -12.7 -4.8 -6.6 -7.5 2.4 
USA -3.0 -0.8 -1.6 -1.9 0.7 
AVERAGE -15.8 -8.6 -11.2 -11.6 2.4 
AVERAGEb -13.0 -5.6 -8.3 -8.7 2.4 
Note: a, standard deviation; b, average without PRT 
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Table 10B Rate of change (%) in Sharpe ratio (OECD), from the QAR to the PPR 
OECD Min Max Median Mean SDa 
AUS 11.4 23.4 19.0 19.0 3.8 
AUT 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.4 0.8 
CAN 0.0 3.5 0.3 0.7 1.1 
CHE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DEU 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 
DNK 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 
ESP 7.6 25.8 15.8 15.9 6.0 
FIN 1.7 5.3 2.5 3.1 1.3 
FRA 15.9 106.1 23.0 33.6 27.5 
GBR 8.7 24.8 17.0 16.8 4.3 
GRE 29.5 202.3 74.2 92.8 61.0 
IRL 24.7 42.9 35.1 35.2 5.5 
JPN 0.4 2.7 0.9 1.3 0.9 
LUX 0.4 2.7 0.9 1.3 0.9 
NLD 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NOR 15.8 27.0 18.6 20.3 4.1 
PRT 112.7 200.1 180.8 174.6 24.6 
SWE 5.1 14.7 7.1 8.2 3.0 
USA 0.8 3.1 1.7 1.9 0.8 
AVERAGE 12.3 36.2 20.9 22.4 7.7 
AVERAGEb 6.8 27.0 12.0 13.9 6.7 
Note: a, standard deviation; b, average without PRT 
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Table 11 Statistical summary, based on the basic model and four variants, OECD and EMEs 
Panel 1: RC (rate of change in risk) 
  
OECD     EMEs 
    
  Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD 
Basic modela Without BL & MO -15.8 -8.6 -11.2 -11.6 2.4 -39.4 -28.0 -32.9 -33.4 4.8 
  -13.0 -5.6 -8.3 -8.7 2.4 -26.3 -14.2 -20.0 -20.2 4.9 
Four variants With BL & MO -14.5 -6.4 -9.0 -9.5 2.7 -37.7 -17.9 -25.5 -27.1 8.5 
  -12.0 -3.7 -6.3 -6.9 2.7 -27.1 -9.0 -14.3 -16.2 7.8 
 Without BL onlyb -14.9 -7.4 -10.0 -10.4 2.5      
  -12.0 -4.4 -7.0 -7.4 2.6      
 Without MO onlyc -14.4 -6.6 -9.4 -9.8 2.5      
  -12.0 -4.0 -6.8 -7.2 2.6      
 Without PR only -17.0 -8.5 -11.5 -12.1 2.8 -38.9 -18.8 -26.7 -28.1 8.7 
  -14.2 -5.9 -8.7 -9.3 2.8 -28.8 -10.2 -15.9 17.7 8.0 
Panel 2: RC* (rate of change in Sharpe ratio)
 
  
OECD     EMEs  
   
  Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD 
Basic modela Without BL & MO 12.3 36.2 20.9 22.4 7.7 68.0 126.5 84.0 91.9 27.0 
  6.8 27.0 12.0 13.9 6.7 18.1 59.5 31.4 34.1 16.3 
Four variants With BL & MO 12.5 33.9 17.6 19.9 7.2 35.5 128.0 71.3 78.2 39.8 
  4.6 25.5 9.4 11.6 7.0 12.0 67.5 26.8 31.9 23.2 
 Without BL onlyb 10.8 33.9 18.9 20.2 7.5      
  5.2 25.4 4.9 11.7 7.0      
 Without MO onlyc 12.8 33.9 18.2 20.3 7.0      
  5.0 25.5 10.0 12.0 6.8      
 Without PR only 16.0 42.0 22.9 25.5 8.5 36.6 130.1 73.0 79.8 40.3 
  8.1 31.6 13.8 16.3 8.0 13.5 70.4 29.0 34.1 23.8 
Source: the author’s own calculations; key, see Table *; a, numbers in the first row under each heading relate to the average over all available countries, while those in the 
row underneath relate to the average excluding large values, i.e. potential outliers; b, data for EMEs under Without BL only are same as data for EMEs under Without 
BL&MO; c, data for EMEs under Without MO only are not available, in that we do not have MO data for EMEs (see Table 2). 
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Table 12 Optimal portfolio compositiona at 5% real return level under the PPR scenariob, EMEs 
EMEs STDEV CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Argentinac           
Brazil           
Chile 4.9   0.478 0.079   0.000     0.000 0.443 
China 2.6   0.485 0.068         0.028 0.420 
Hong Kong 7.8   0.078 0.106   0.338     0.015 0.463 
Indonesia 4.0 0.065   0.073   0.800     0.015 0.046 
India 3.5   0.065 0.000   0.822     0.022 0.091 
Israle 3.4   0.184 0.000   0.693     0.003 0.120 
Korea                     
Mexico                     
Malaysia 8.9   0.608 0.075   0.002     0.000 0.316 
Pakistan 3.5   0.022 0.020   0.767     0.000 0.191 
Peru                     
Philippine 0.9 0.203 0.791 0.005   0.001     0.000 0.000 
Singapore 7.9   0.329 0.000   0.000   0.181 0.000 0.490 
Thailand 4.8   0.196 0.030   0.735     0.039 0.000 
S. Africa 9.8   0.173 0.186   0.274     0.000 0.367 
Average 5.2 0.134 0.310 0.053   0.403   0.181 0.010 0.245 
Standardised averaged 3.9 0.100 0.232 0.040  0.301  0.136 0.008 0.184 
Combined foreign assetse: 0.191          
Combined equitiesf: 0.048          
Combined bondsg: 0.516          
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, optimal weights reported here are the average between a set of estimates, i.e. estimates calculated by using 
different sub-samples (see main text for details); b, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, 
standardised average, calculated by using Equation 10 in the main text; e, FEQ plus FB; f, EQ plus FEQ; g, CB plus GB plus FB 
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Table 13 Optimal portfolio compositiona at 7% real return level under the PPR scenariob, EMEs 
EMEs STDEV CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Argentinac           
Brazil           
Chile 6.3   0.350 0.080   0.000     0.000 0.570 
China 3.4   0.358 0.094         0.042 0.506 
Hong Kong 11.3   0.183 0.162   0.062     0.024 0.569 
Indonesia 6.9 0.023   0.018   0.879     0.080 0.000 
India 4.7   0.186 0.006   0.515     0.023 0.269 
Israle 4.1   0.583 0.000   0.209     0.021 0.187 
Korea                     
Mexico                     
Malaysia 15.1   0.118 0.193   0.000     0.223 0.466 
Pakistan 4.3   0.004 0.018   0.600     0.000 0.377 
Peru 3.4 0.956   0.011         0.028 0.005 
Philippine 1.9 0.000 0.943 0.000   0.000     0.038 0.019 
Singapore 14.9   0.005 0.000   0.000   0.383 0.027 0.586 
Thailand 7.4   0.356 0.049   0.392     0.112 0.092 
S. Africa 11.2   0.212 0.216   0.146     0.000 0.426 
Average 7.3 0.326 0.300 0.065   0.255   0.383 0.047 0.313 
Standardised averaged 4.3 0.193 0.177 0.039 0.000 0.151   0.227 0.028 0.185 
Combined foreign assetse: 0.214          
Combined equitiesf: 0.067          
Combined bondsg: 0.556          
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, optimal weights reported here are the average between a set of estimates, i.e. estimates calculated by using 
different sub-samples (see main text for details); b, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, 
standardised average, calculated by using Equation 10 in the main text; e, FEQ plus FB; f, EQ plus FEQ; g, CB plus GB plus FB 
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Table 14 Optimal portfolio compositiona at 9% real return level under the PPR scenariob, EMEs 
EMEs STDEV CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Argentinac 3.6 0.678 0.156 0.006   0.003     0.083 0.020 
Brazil                     
Chile 7.7   0.221 0.081   0.000     0.000 0.697 
China 5.0   0.144 0.142         0.063 0.651 
Hong Kong 15.8   0.209 0.301   0.000     0.031 0.459 
Indonesia 10.9 0.062   0.000   0.854     0.135 0.002 
India 6.4   0.318 0.030   0.189     0.014 0.448 
Israle 6.1   0.557 0.000   0.000     0.041 0.402 
Korea 3.9 0.536 0.282 0.019   0.146     0.017 0.000 
Mexico                     
Malaysia 22.1   0.032 0.157   0.000     0.635 0.176 
Pakistan 5.4   0.000 0.017   0.424     0.002 0.558 
Peru 5.5 0.894   0.041        0.065 0.000 
Philippine 6.5 0.000 0.692 0.000   0.000     0.141 0.167 
Singapore 24.1   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.553 0.158 0.290 
Thailand 10.6   0.483 0.071   0.050     0.182 0.214 
S. Africa 12.6   0.230 0.249   0.028     0.000 0.493 
Average 9.8 0.434 0.256 0.074   0.130   0.553 0.104 0.305 
Standardised averaged 5.3 0.234 0.138 0.040  0.070  0.298 0.056 0.164 
Combined foreign assetse: 0.221          
Combined equitiesf: 0.096          
Combined bondsg: 0.536          
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, optimal weights reported here are the average between a set of estimates, i.e. estimates calculated by using 
different sub-samples (see main text for details); b, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, 
standardised average, calculated by using Equation 10 in the main text; e, FEQ plus FB; f, EQ plus FEQ; g, CB plus GB plus FB 
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Table 15 Optimal portfolio compositiona at 5% real return level under the PPR scenariob, OECD 
OECD STDEV CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Australia 6.5 0.010 0.000 0.085   0.485   0.199 0.049 0.171 
Austria 9.2   0.648 0.164   0.166   0.000 0.022 0.000 
Belgiumc 6.8   0.259 0.206   0.362   0.143 0.030 0.000 
Canada 3.2 0.090 0.000 0.041   0.551   0.311 0.008 0.000 
Switzerland 11.7 0.098 0.000 0.461   0.349   0.091 0.000 0.000 
Germany 4.7 0.000 0.372 0.056   0.282   0.291 0.000 0.000 
Denmark                     
Spain 1.9 0.957 0.015 0.012   0.003   0.004 0.000 0.009 
Finland 6.4   0.074 0.098   0.711     0.003 0.113 
France 1.1 0.919 0.000 0.002   0.038   0.006 0.017 0.019 
UK 8.8 0.000 0.405 0.063   0.096   0.079 0.043 0.315 
Greece 6.2   0.570 0.000   0.234     0.000 0.197 
Ireland 9.0   0.000 0.003   0.381   0.091 0.000 0.526 
Italy 1.3 0.904 0.018 0.000   0.000   0.014 0.013 0.051 
Japan 8.8 0.048 0.577 0.017   0.058   0.215 0.085 0.000 
Luxembourg 2.4   0.000 0.058   0.931     0.011 0.000 
Netherlands 5.3 0.022 0.253 0.159   0.130   0.433 0.002 0.000 
Norway 7.0   0.000 0.001   0.641   0.085 0.088 0.185 
New Zealand 7.8   0.000 0.000   0.613   0.000 0.149 0.238 
Portugal 7.6   0.087 0.019   0.407   0.065 0.003 0.419 
Sweden 7.7 0.000 0.003 0.130   0.621   0.013 0.057 0.175 
USA 7.9 0.219 0.000 0.323   0.048   0.243 0.014 0.154 
Average 6.3 0.272 0.156 0.090   0.338   0.127 0.028 0.122 
Standardised averaged 5.3 0.240 0.138 0.080   0.298   0.112 0.025 0.108 
Combined foreign assetse: 0.133               
Combined equitiesf: 0.105               
Combined bondsg: 0.485               
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Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, optimal weights reported here are the average between a set of estimates, i.e. estimates calculated by using 
different sub-samples (see main text for details); b, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, 
standardised average, calculated by using Equation 10 in the main text; e, FEQ plus FB; f, EQ plus FEQ; g, CB plus GB plus FB 
 
Table 16 Optimal portfolio compositiona at 7% real return level under the PPR scenariob, OECD 
OECD STDEV CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Australia 10.4 0.023 0.014 0.126   0.093   0.328 0.121 0.295 
Austria 9.2   0.166 0.256   0.000   0.000 0.578 0.000 
Belgiumc 15.4   0.127 0.551   0.021   0.130 0.171 0.000 
Canada 5.1 0.170 0.005 0.044   0.139   0.605 0.038 0.000 
Switzerland 16.8 0.141 0.000 0.670   0.113   0.075 0.000 0.000 
Germany 6.9 0.000 0.369 0.103   0.009   0.505 0.014 0.000 
Denmark 4.7 0.006 0.000 0.007   0.764   0.205 0.000 0.018 
Spain 4.7 0.722 0.000 0.046   0.000   0.094 0.059 0.079 
Finland 10.5   0.219 0.209   0.367     0.023 0.181 
France 7.2 0.674 0.000 0.086   0.000   0.000 0.240 0.000 
UK 11.7 0.000 0.196 0.134   0.000   0.104 0.110 0.456 
Greece 7.0   0.701 0.002   0.000     0.007 0.290 
Ireland 11.6   0.000 0.024   0.190   0.126 0.001 0.660 
Italy 6.6 0.568 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.011 0.156 0.265 
Japan 8.8 0.048 0.577 0.017   0.058   0.215 0.085 0.000 
Luxembourg 11.1   0.000 0.303   0.595     0.102 0.000 
Netherlands 9.4 0.056 0.077 0.391   0.000   0.475 0.000 0.000 
Norway 11.2   0.000 0.002   0.379   0.153 0.164 0.303 
New Zealand 12.0   0.000 0.000   0.320   0.000 0.287 0.393 
Portugal 9.4   0.106 0.035   0.275   0.041 0.009 0.534 
Sweden 12.1 0.000 0.009 0.246   0.331   0.021 0.076 0.317 
USA 13.3 0.028 0.000 0.554   0.000   0.215 0.197 0.006 
Average 9.8 0.187 0.117 0.173   0.166   0.174 0.111 0.173 
Standardised averaged 8.9 0.170 0.106 0.157   0.151   0.158 0.101 0.157 
Combined foreign assetse:     0.258             
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Combined equitiesf:     0.258             
Combined bondsg:     0.433             
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, optimal weights reported here are the average between a set of estimates, i.e. estimates calculated by using 
different sub-samples (see main text for details); b, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, 
standardised average, calculated by using Equation 10 in the main text; e, FEQ plus FB; f, EQ plus FEQ; g, CB plus GB plus FB 
 
Table 17 Optimal portfolio compositiona at 9% real return level under the PPR scenariob, OECD 
OECD STDEV CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Australia 16.0 0.000 0.000 0.135   0.000   0.232 0.406 0.226 
Austria           
Belgiumc 20.0   0.015 0.520   0.000   0.098 0.367 0.000 
Canada 11.6 0.001 0.000 0.006   0.008   0.547 0.438 0.000 
Switzerland                     
Germany 9.5 0.000 0.088 0.070   0.000   0.840 0.002 0.000 
Denmark 6.2 0.009 0.000 0.027   0.516   0.426 0.000 0.022 
Spain 10.7 0.358 0.000 0.088   0.000   0.229 0.153 0.172 
Finland 15.3   0.227 0.337   0.156     0.044 0.236 
France 19.1 0.179 0.000 0.186   0.000   0.000 0.635 0.000 
UK 16.0 0.000 0.000 0.229   0.000   0.121 0.274 0.377 
Greece 9.0   0.478 0.020   0.000     0.069 0.433 
Ireland 14.4   0.000 0.041   0.015   0.171 0.003 0.769 
Italy 12.8 0.208 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.014 0.299 0.479 
Japan 17.1 0.154 0.040 0.208   0.000   0.546 0.052 0.000 
Luxembourg 20.4   0.000 0.548   0.259     0.192 0.000 
Netherlands 15.9 0.054 0.000 0.696   0.000   0.249 0.000 0.000 
Norway 15.7   0.000 0.003   0.124   0.221 0.241 0.411 
New Zealand 16.8   0.000 0.000   0.049   0.000 0.452 0.500 
Portugal 11.3   0.124 0.050   0.144   0.018 0.019 0.645 
Sweden 16.7 0.000 0.000 0.373   0.076   0.028 0.105 0.419 
USA  0.000 0.000 0.135   0.000   0.232 0.406 0.226 
Average 14.5 0.088 0.051 0.186   0.071   0.234 0.198 0.247 
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Standardised averaged 13.5 0.082 0.048 0.173   0.066   0.218 0.184 0.230 
Combined foreign assetse:   0.414       
Combined equitiesf:   0.357       
Combined bondsg:   0.359       
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, optimal weights reported here are the average between a set of estimates, i.e. estimates calculated by using 
different sub-samples (see main text for details); b, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, 
standardised average, calculated by using Equation 10 in the main text; e, FEQ plus FB; f, EQ plus FEQ; g, CB plus GB plus FB 
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Table 18 Statistical summary of standard deviation by portfolio return, OECD 
countries and EMEs 
  
OECD  EMEs
 
  
5% 7% 9%   5% 7% 9% 
Australia 5.0 9.9 16.0 Argentina     3.6 
Austria 9.2 9.2   Brazil       
Belgium       Chile 4.9 6.3 7.7 
Canada 2.5 4.4 11.6 China 2.6 3.4 5.0 
Switzerland 10.4 16.2   Hong Kong 7.8 11.3 15.8 
Germany 2.7 6.8 9.5 Indonesia 4.0 6.9 10.9 
Denmark   3.5 5.4 India 3.5 4.7 6.4 
Spain 1.9 4.7 10.7 Israel 3.4 4.1 6.1 
Finland 6.4 10.5 15.3 Korea     3.9 
France 1.1 7.2 19.1 Mexico       
UK 6.6 11.0 16.0 Malaysia 8.9 15.1 22.1 
Greece 6.2 7.0 9.0 Pakistan 3.5 4.3 5.4 
Ireland 9.0 11.6 14.4 Peru   3.4 5.5 
Italy 1.3 6.6 12.8 Philippine 0.9 1.9 6.5 
Japan 5.1 12.8 17.1 Singapore 7.9 14.9 24.1 
Luxembourg 2.4 11.1 20.4 Thailand 4.8 7.4 10.6 
Netherlands 3.3 8.3 15.9 S. Africa 9.8 11.2 12.6 
Norway 7.0 11.2 15.7 AVERAGE 5.2 7.3 9.8 
New Zealand 2.8 5.7 14.2 Std AV 3.9 4.3 5.3 
Portugal 7.6 9.4 11.3         
Sweden 4.1 9.6 15.6         
USA 3.9 13.5           
AVERAGE 4.9 9.1 13.9 
    
Std AV 3.5 7.3 12.2 
    
Source: Tables 12 through 17 
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Table 19A Statistical summary of optimal portfolio composition, based on the basic model and four variants, OECD 
  
Return  
level CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Basic model Without BL & MO 5% 0.240 0.138 0.080  0.298  0.112 0.025 0.108 
  7% 0.170 0.106 0.157  0.151  0.158 0.101 0.157 
  9% 0.082 0.048 0.173  0.066  0.218 0.184 0.230 
Four variants With BL & MO 5% 0.199 0.037 0.038 0.230 0.069 0.349 0.030 0.008 0.040 
  7% 0.128 0.027 0.124 0.360 0.025 0.112 0.074 0.080 0.070 
  9% 0.084 0.009 0.143 0.227 0.014 0.039 0.182 0.179 0.122 
 Without BL only 5% 0.186 0.058 0.050  0.131 0.456 0.039 0.012 0.068 
  7% 0.168 0.063 0.125  0.071 0.256 0.113 0.084 0.120 
  9% 0.076 0.047 0.149  0.034 0.121 0.209 0.173 0.189 
 Without MO only 5% 0.186 0.062 0.046 0.400 0.168  0.043 0.017 0.078 
  7% 0.119 0.051 0.107 0.377 0.072  0.077 0.085 0.111 
  9% 0.050 0.040 0.126 0.227 0.032  0.193 0.163 0.170 
 Without PR only 5% 0.180 0.037 0.046 0.253 0.068 0.360  0.013 0.042 
  7% 0.119 0.034 0.142 0.355 0.023 0.149  0.105 0.072 
  9% 0.080 0.011 0.231 0.186 0.015 0.068  0.282 0.126 
Source: the author’s own calculations.  
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Table 19B Statistical summary of optimal portfolio composition, based on the basic model and four variants, EMEs 
  
Return  
level CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
Basic model Without BL & MO 5% 0.100 0.232 0.040  0.301  0.136 0.008 0.184 
  7% 0.193 0.177 0.039  0.151  0.227 0.028 0.185 
  9% 0.234 0.138 0.040  0.070  0.298 0.056 0.164 
Four variants With BL & MO 5% 0.000 0.088 0.024 0.528 0.215  0.053 0.004 0.088 
  7% 0.000 0.088 0.024 0.528 0.215  0.053 0.004 0.088 
  9% 0.235 0.060 0.042 0.290 0.036  0.166 0.044 0.126 
 Without BL only 5%          
  7%          
  9%          
 Without MO only 5%          
  7%          
  9%          
 Without PR only 5% 0.000 0.093 0.026 0.549 0.226   0.013 0.093 
  7% 0.295 0.087 0.033 0.370 0.087   0.038 0.090 
  9% 0.320 0.060 0.048 0.308 0.039   0.079 0.146 
Source: the author’s own calculations.  
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Table 20 Statistical summary of aggregate asset allocation by group and 
portfolio return, based on the basic model and four variants, OECD countries 
and EMEs 
   
OECD    EMEs 
   
   STDEV Foreign Equities Bonds STDEV Foreign Equities Bonds 
Four variants With BL & MO 5% 2.9 0.048 0.046 0.277 2.4 0.092 0.028 0.177 
  7% 6.5 0.150 0.204 0.225 2.4 0.089 0.040 0.398 
  9% 11.6 0.301 0.322 0.215 4.6 0.171 0.086 0.422 
 Without BL only 5% 3.5 0.080 0.062 0.312     
  7% 7.3 0.204 0.209 0.351     
  9% 12.2 0.363 0.323 0.312     
 Without MO only 5% 3.8 0.094 0.062 0.327     
  7% 6.7 0.197 0.192 0.281     
  9% 11.5 0.333 0.289 0.260     
 Without PR only 5% 3.2 0.055 0.059 0.259 2.7 0.106 0.039 0.186 
  7% 7.4 0.177 0.247 0.226 3.3 0.127 0.071 0.472 
  9% 14.7 0.408 0.513 0.217 5.3 0.225 0.127 0.526 
Basic model Without BL & MO 5% 5.5 0.133 0.105 0.485 3.9 0.191 0.048 0.516 
  7% 8.9 0.258 0.258 0.433 4.3 0.214 0.067 0.556 
  9% 13.5 0.414 0.357 0.359 5.3 0.221 0.096 0.536 
Source: the author’s own calculations.  
 
 
Table 21 A comparison between pension fund portfolios and optimal portfolios 
in selected OECD countries, 2003/2004 
 
 Actual portfolio 
Country/Year 
Portfolio 
returna 
Domestic 
Bonds 
Domestic 
equities 
Short-term 
assets Property 
Foreign 
equities 
Foreign 
bonds Others 
AUS 2003 10.1% 0.080 0.452 0.145 0.057 0.197 0.000 0.070 
CAN 2003 10.1% 0.313 0.264 0.024 0.067 0.293 0.005 0.035 
JPN 2004 5.0% 0.260 0.290 0.110 0.010 0.160 0.110 0.060 
CHE 2003 9.7% 0.340 0.130 0.080 0.160 0.140 0.100 0.050 
GBR 2003 8.3% 0.182 0.359 0.033 0.054 0.182 0.042 0.150 
USA 2004 5.9% 0.330 0.470 0.010 0.020 0.130 0.010 0.030 
          
 
 Optimal portfolio 
Country/Year 
Portfolio 
returnb 
Domestic 
bonds 
Domestic 
equities 
Short-term 
assets Property 
Foreign 
equities 
Foreign 
bonds Othersc 
AUS 2003 9% 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.232 0.406 0.226 0.000 
CAN 2003 9% 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.547 0.438 0.000 0.000 
JPN 2004 5% 0.625 0.017 0.058 0.215 0.085 0.000 0.000 
CHE 2003 9% 0.141 0.670 0.113 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GBR 2003 9% 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.121 0.274 0.377 0.000 
USA 2004 5% 0.219 0.323 0.048 0.243 0.014 0.154 0.000 
Source: a, portfolio returns for JPN are from www.nikko-fi.co.jp (Nikko Financial Intelligence), and 
for GBR are from Clark and Hu (2005a); returns for AUS, CAN, CHE, and USA are calculated by 
using asset returns and portfolio composition data by the author. Data of asset returns are from a 
number of sources, see Table 1; As to portfolio composition, data source for AUS is www.rba.gov.au 
(Reserve Bank of Australia), for CAN is www.piacweb.org (Pension Investment Association of 
Canada), for JPN, CHE and USA is UBS Pension Fund Indicators (2005) (occupational pension 
schemes), for GBR is National Financial Statistics, while for USA is www.federalreserve.gov  (Federal 
Reserve); b, portfolio returns under the optimal portfolio are selected to be closest to the returns in 
corresponding actual portfolios; c, by our definition in Section 5.3, allocation to “others” is zero.  
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Figure 1. Efficient frontiers with seven countries 
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Appendix 1 Optimal portfolio composition (%) under the basic model and the PPR scenarioa, Singapore 
  
Sub-
sample 
periodb  SD CBc GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
5%d ~2000 7.4   0.500 0.000   0.000   0.163 0.000 0.337 
  ~2001 8.8   0.283 0.000   0.000   0.201 0.000 0.516 
  ~2002 8.1   0.308 0.000   0.000   0.183 0.000 0.509 
  ~2003 7.7   0.296 0.000   0.000   0.178 0.000 0.526 
  ~2004 7.7   0.256 0.000   0.000   0.181 0.000 0.563 
  Mean 7.9   0.329 0.000   0.000   0.181 0.000 0.490 
  SD 0.6   0.098 0.000   0.000   0.013 0.000 0.088 
7% ~2000 11.9   0.025 0.000   0.000   0.295 0.000 0.681 
  ~2001 15.8   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.376 0.052 0.572 
  ~2002 17.0   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.461 0.000 0.539 
  ~2003 14.6   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.404 0.000 0.596 
  ~2004 15.2   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.379 0.080 0.541 
  Mean 14.9   0.005 0.000   0.000   0.383 0.027 0.586 
  SD 1.9   0.011 0.000   0.000   0.060 0.038 0.058 
9% ~2000 17.3   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.456 0.014 0.530 
  ~2001 24.3   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.441 0.302 0.257 
  ~2002 29.4   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.784 0.000 0.216 
  ~2003 24.5   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.605 0.116 0.280 
  ~2004 25.2   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.478 0.356 0.166 
  
Mean 24.1   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.553 0.158 0.290 
  
SD 4.3   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.145 0.164 0.141 
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; b, datasets with different sub-sample 
periods ending at 2000 until 2004; c, blank entries mean data are not available or zero; d, in real term after inflation 
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Appendix 2 Optimal portfolio composition (%) under the basic model and the PPR scenarioa, UK 
 
Sub-
sample 
periodb  SD CB GB EQ BL MP MO PR FEQ FB 
5%c ~1995 9.1 0.000 0.252 0.095   0.000   0.260 0.024 0.370 
 ~1996 9.2 0.000 0.368 0.071   0.094   0.105 0.031 0.331 
 ~1997 9.0 0.000 0.344 0.070   0.161   0.070 0.031 0.323 
 ~1998 9.1 0.000 0.430 0.064   0.099   0.048 0.052 0.308 
 ~1999 8.9 0.000 0.374 0.071   0.148   0.052 0.064 0.292 
 ~2000 8.6 0.000 0.361 0.069   0.172   0.052 0.053 0.293 
 ~2001 8.7 0.000 0.416 0.059   0.117   0.051 0.051 0.307 
 ~2002 8.7 0.000 0.502 0.044   0.043   0.046 0.039 0.326 
 ~2003 8.5 0.000 0.481 0.044   0.073   0.052 0.041 0.309 
 ~2004 8.5 0.000 0.517 0.043   0.048   0.053 0.047 0.293 
 Mean 8.8 0.000 0.405 0.063   0.096   0.079 0.043 0.315 
 SD 0.3 0.000 0.082 0.016   0.056   0.066 0.012 0.024 
7% ~1995 12.4 0.000 0.000 0.184   0.000   0.209 0.130 0.477 
 ~1996 11.7 0.000 0.166 0.135   0.000   0.152 0.083 0.463 
 ~1997 11.3 0.000 0.285 0.104   0.000   0.111 0.073 0.427 
 ~1998 11.9 0.000 0.238 0.137   0.000   0.072 0.127 0.426 
 ~1999 11.5 0.000 0.283 0.118   0.000   0.077 0.137 0.384 
 ~2000 11.1 0.000 0.302 0.106   0.000   0.083 0.115 0.394 
 ~2001 11.5 0.000 0.228 0.123   0.000   0.083 0.118 0.448 
 ~2002 12.3 0.000 0.097 0.157   0.000   0.077 0.101 0.568 
 ~2003 11.7 0.000 0.183 0.129   0.000   0.087 0.101 0.499 
 ~2004 11.9 0.000 0.173 0.144   0.000   0.090 0.115 0.478 
 Mean 11.7 0.000 0.196 0.134   0.000   0.104 0.110 0.456 
 SD 0.4 0.000 0.094 0.024   0.000   0.044 0.020 0.054 
9% ~1995 17.2 0.000 0.000 0.250   0.000   0.012 0.318 0.420 
 ~1996 15.6 0.000 0.000 0.231   0.000   0.184 0.273 0.312 
 ~1997 14.2 0.000 0.000 0.188   0.000   0.161 0.143 0.508 
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 ~1998 15.7 0.000 0.000 0.242   0.000   0.094 0.277 0.387 
 ~1999 14.9 0.000 0.000 0.211   0.000   0.103 0.242 0.444 
 ~2000 14.3 0.000 0.000 0.195   0.000   0.120 0.204 0.481 
 ~2001 15.6 0.000 0.000 0.217   0.000   0.126 0.279 0.377 
 ~2002 19.0 0.000 0.000 0.286   0.000   0.125 0.415 0.175 
 ~2003 16.7 0.000 0.000 0.220   0.000   0.142 0.287 0.351 
 ~2004 17.1 0.000 0.000 0.244   0.000   0.143 0.303 0.311 
 Mean 16.0 0.000 0.000 0.229   0.000   0.121 0.274 0.377 
 SD 1.5 0.000 0.000 0.029   0.000   0.047 0.071 0.097 
Source: own calculations, based on Equation 3; key see Table 1; a, refers to the policy without any foreign investment constraint; b, datasets with different sub-sample 
periods ending at 2000 until 2004; c, in real term after inflation 
 
 
